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Summary
This thesis consists of three chapters on mechanism design.1 The first
chapter studies the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. The second
chapter examines the equivalence of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms.
In the third chapter, we focus on the design of e cient mechanisms in dynamic
environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information.
The first chapter. Traditional models in mechanism design make strong
assumptions about the agents’ hierarchies of beliefs about each other. For
example, in models with independent types, agents’ beliefs about other agents
are common knowledge among the agents and the mechanism designer. This
seems peculiar in the context of mechanism design, where the focus is on
asymmetric information; imperfect information about others’ beliefs seems at
least as pervasive as imperfect information about others’ preferences. Relaxing
these assumptions has been the focus of the literature of robust mechanism
design. We consider a revenue-maximizing mechanism designer who has an
estimate of the distribution of the agents’ payo -relevant observations, but she
does not have any reliable information about the agents’ beliefs (including their
beliefs about one another’s payo  types, their beliefs about these beliefs, etc.).
1The first chapter is coauthored with Yi-Chun Chen; the second chapter is coauthored
with Yi-Chun Chen, Wei He, and Yeneng Sun; the third chapter is coauthored with Wei He.
The third chapter has been published in Games and Economic Behavior.
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The mechanism designer could use a dominant-strategy mechanism, which
does not rely on any assumptions of the agents’ beliefs. Alternatively, the
mechanism designer could use mechanisms that ask the agents to report their
beliefs about one another’s payo  types, and to report their beliefs about these
beliefs, etc. In the extreme, the mechanism designer could use mechanisms
that ask the agents to report everything; that is, their whole infinite hierarchies
of beliefs. We examine whether there is any theoretical foundation (in terms of
optimality) for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms.
The second chapter. The mechanism design literature essentially builds
on the assumption that a mechanism designer can credibly commit to any
outcome. This requirement implies that any outcome of the mechanism must
be verifiable before it can be employed. In this vein, a stochastic mechanism
demands not only that a randomization device be available to the mechanism
designer, but also that the outcome of the randomization device be objectively
verified. As noted in La ont and Martimort (2002, p. 67), “Ensuring this
verifiability is a more di cult problem than ensuring that a deterministic mech-
anism is enforced. ... The enforcement of such stochastic mechanisms is thus
particularly problematic.” In the second chapter, we consider a general social
choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, and
independent and dispersed information. We prove that for any Bayesian incen-
vii
tive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism.
A deterministic mechanism is robust to the availability of the randomization
device, and the ability of the mechanism designer to commit to any outcome
induced by the randomization device. Our result implies that every mecha-
nism can in fact be deterministically implemented, and thereby irons out the
conceptual di culties associated with stochastic mechanisms.
The third chapter. We focus on the design of e cient mechanisms in
dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private
information. Under the assumption that each agent observes her own realized
outcome-decision payo  from the previous period, we construct an e cient,




Revisiting the Foundations of
Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
1.1 Introduction
Suppose that a revenue-maximizing mechanism designer has an estimate of
the distribution of the agents’ payo  types, but she does not have any reliable
information about the agents’ beliefs (including their beliefs about one another’s
payo  types, their beliefs about these beliefs, etc.), as these are arguably never
observed. The mechanism designer ranks mechanisms according to their worst-
case performance - the minimum expected revenue - where the minimum is
taken over all possible agents’ beliefs. The use of dominant-strategy mechanisms
has a maxmin foundation if the mechanism designer finds it optimal to use a
dominant-strategy mechanism.
A closely related notion is the Bayesian foundation. The use of dominant-
strategy mechanisms is said to have a Bayesian foundation if there exists a
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particular assumption about (the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs, against
which the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism achieves the highest expected
revenue among all detail-free mechanisms. Note that if there exists such an
assumption, then the worst-case expected revenue of an arbitrary detail-free
mechanism obviously cannot exceed its expected revenue against this particular
assumption, which in turn cannot exceed the worst-case expected revenue of
the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism. Therefore, the Bayesian foundation
is a stronger notion than the maxmin foundation.
In the context of a revenue-maximizing auctioneer, Chung and Ely (2007)
show that, under a regularity condition on the distribution of the bidders’
valuations, the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian
foundations. What has been missing thus far from the literature on mechanism
design is the study of such foundations in general environments. In this
paper, we study the maxmin and Bayesian foundations in general social choice
environments with quasi-linear preferences and private values. This exposes the
underlying logic of the existence of such foundations in the single-unit auction
setting, and extends the argument to cases where it was hitherto unknown.
We start with the following contrast between two bilateral trade models
(Section 1.3). In the standard bilateral trade model in which traders are ex
ante identified buyers or sellers, the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms
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has maxmin and Bayesian foundations. We then consider a bilateral trade
model with ex ante unidentified traders. In this economic environment, we
explicitly construct a single Bayesian mechanism that does strictly better than
the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, regardless of the assumption about
(the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs. In other words, there is neither a
Bayesian foundation nor a maxmin foundation. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first example of a revenue maximization setting in which the use of
dominant-strategy mechanisms does not have a maxmin foundation.1
From this contrast, we abstract the uniform shortest-path tree condition.
Our result builds on the recent literature on the network approach to mechanism
design, in particular, Rochet and Stole (2003), Heydenreich, Müller, Uetz, and
Vohra (2009), Vohra (2011) and Kos and Messner (2013).2 We formulate
the optimal mechanism design question as a network flow problem, and the
optimization problem reduces to determining the shortest-path tree (the union
of all shortest-paths from the source to all nodes) in this network. We say that
there is uniform shortest-path tree if for each agent, the shortest-path tree
is the same for all dominant-strategy implementable decision rules and other
1Chung and Ely (2007, Proposition 2) construct an example in which a Bayesian
foundation does not exist, but their construction is silent about the existence of a maxmin
foundation. Bergemann and Morris (2005) study an implementability problem. Börgers
(2013) adopts a di erent notion of optimality.




We show that under an additional regularity condition, the uniform shortest-
path tree ensures the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy
mechanisms (Theorem 1.1). The uniform shortest-path tree is largely responsi-
ble for the success of mechanism design in numerous applications across various
fields. Loosely speaking, the same features that make optimal mechanism
design tractable also provide maxmin and Bayesian foundations for the use
of dominant-strategy mechanisms. To prove this result, we adopt the linear
programming approach to mechanism design, which exposes the underlying
logic behind the existence of such foundations.3 In particular, this gives us a
recipe for constructing the assumption about (the distribution of) the agents’
beliefs for the Bayesian foundation.
The uniform shortest-path tree condition is of interest because a number of
resource allocation problems satisfy this condition. We examine its applicability
in prominent environments. First, the uniform shortest-path tree condition
is satisfied in environments with linear utilities and one-dimensional types.
This fits many classical applications of mechanism design, including single-unit
auction (e.g., Myerson (1981)), public good (e.g., Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990)), and standard bilateral trade (e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
3We are indebted to Rakesh Vohra for bringing to our attention a closely related paper
by Sher and Vohra (2015), as well as for suggestions along this direction.
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The uniform shortest-path tree condition also holds in multi-unit auctions
with homogeneous or heterogeneous goods, combinatorial auctions and the
like, as long as the agents’ private values are one-dimensional and utilities
are linear. In such a case, the payo  types are linearly ordered via a single
path. Second, the uniform shortest-path tree condition can also be satisfied in
some multi-dimensional environments. In particular, we consider the multi-unit
auction with capacitated bidders (see Malakhov and Vohra (2009)). In this case,
the agent’s payo  types are located on di erent paths and are only partially
ordered. For both applications, we provide primitive conditions for regularity.
When the uniform shortest-path tree condition is violated, maxmin/ Bayesian
foundations might not exist. If the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism ex-
hibits certain properties, we can construct a single Bayesian mechanism that
robustly achieves strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal dominant-
strategy mechanism, regardless of the agents’ beliefs (Theorem 1.2). We stress
that as a no-foundation result, this is remarkably strong. In addition to bilat-
eral trade with ex ante unidentified traders, we apply this result to auction
with type-dependent outside option.
The remainder of this introduction discusses some related literature. Section
2.2 presents the notations, concepts, and the model. Section 1.3 contrasts two
bilateral trade models. Section 1.4 formulates the notion of the uniform shortest-
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path tree and presents the results. Section 1.5 studies three applications of the
results and Section 2.5 concludes with discussions.
1.1.1 Related literature
In a seminal paper, Bergemann and Morris (2005) ask whether a fixed so-
cial choice correspondence - mapping payo  type profiles to sets of possible
allocations - can or cannot be robustly partially implemented. Thus they
focus on a “yes or no” question. In contrast, we consider the objective of
revenue maximization for the mechanism designer (under her estimate about
the distribution of the agents’ payo  types), allowing all possible beliefs and
higher-order beliefs of the agents. The best mechanism from the point of view
of the mechanism designer will in general not be separable, and thus the results
of Bergemann and Morris (2005) do not apply.
This paper joins a growing literature exploring mechanism design with
worst case objectives. This includes the seminal work of Bergemann and
Morris (2005), Chung and Ely (2007), and more recently, Carroll (2015, 2016),
Yamashita (2014, 2016), and Du (2016), among others.
Another recent line of literature studies the equivalence of Bayesian and
dominant-strategy mechanisms; see, for example, Manelli and Vincent (2010),
Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013) and Goeree and Kushnir
(2015). Our paper di ers from these in that the mechanism designer in our
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model does not make any assumptions about the agents’ beliefs.
1.2 Preliminaries
1.2.1 Notation
There is a finite set I = {1, 2, ..., I} of risk-neutral agents and a finite set
K = {1, 2, ..., K} of social alternatives. Agent i’s payo  type vi œ RK represents
her gross utility under the K alternatives.4 The set of possible payo  types
of agent i is a finite set Vi µ RK . The set of possible payo  type profiles is
V =  iœIVi with generic payo  type profile v = (v1, v2, ..., vI). We write v≠i for
a payo  type profile of agent i’s opponents, i.e., v≠i œ V≠i =  j ”=iVj. If Y is a
measurable space, then  Y is the set of all probability measures on Y . If Y is
a metric space, then we treat it as a measurable space with its Borel ‡-algebra.
1.2.2 Types
We follow the standard approach to model agents’ information using a type
space. A type space, denoted   = ( i, fi, gi)iœI , is defined by a measurable
space of types  i for each agent, and a pair of measurable mappings fi :  i æ Vi,
defining the payo  type of each type, and gi :  i æ  ( ≠i), defining each
type’s belief about the types of the other agents.
4We may represent the agent’s payo  types in di erent ways. For instance, when studying
one-dimensional payo  types (Section 1.5.1), it is more convenient to represent agent i’s
payo  type by vi œ R.
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A type space encodes in a parsimonious way the beliefs and all higher-order
beliefs of the agents. One simple kind of type space is the naive type space
generated by a payo  type distribution ﬁ œ   (V ). In the naive type space,
each agent believes that all agents’ payo  types are drawn from the distribution
ﬁ, and this is common knowledge. Formally, a naive type space associated
with ﬁ is a type space  ﬁ = ( i, fi, gi)iœI such that  i = Vi, fi (vi) = vi, and
gi(vi)[v≠i] = ﬁ(v≠i|vi) for every vi and v≠i. The naive type space is used almost
without exception in auction theory and mechanism design. The cost of this
parsimonious model is that it implicitly embeds some strong assumptions about
the agents’ beliefs, and these assumptions are not innocuous. For example,
if the agents’ payo  types are independent under ﬁ, then in the naive type
space, the agents’ beliefs are common knowledge. On the other hand, for a
generic ﬁ, it is common knowledge that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between payo  types and beliefs. Myerson (1981) characterizes the optimal
auction in the independent case and Crémer and McLean (1988) in the other
case. Which of these cases holds makes a big di erence for the structure and
welfare properties of the optimal auction. The spirit of the Wilson Doctrine is
to avoid making such assumptions.
To implement the Wilson Doctrine, the common approach is to maintain
the naive type space, but try to diminish its adverse e ect by imposing stronger
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solution concepts. To provide foundations for this methodology, we have to
return to the fundamentals. Formally, weaker assumptions about the agents’
beliefs are captured by larger type spaces. Indeed, we can remove these
assumptions altogether by allowing for every conceivable hierarchy of higher-
order beliefs. By the results of Mertens and Zamir (1985), there exists a
universal type space,  ú = ( úi , fúi , gúi )iœI , with the property that, for every
payo  type vi and every infinite hierarchy of beliefs hˆi, there is a type Êi œ  úi
of agent i with payo  type vi and whose hierarchy is hˆi. Moreover, each  úi is
a compact topological space.5
When we start with the universal type space, we remove any implicit
assumptions about the agents’ beliefs. We can now explicitly model any
such assumption as a probability distribution over the agents’ universal types.
Specifically, an assumption for the mechanism designer is a distribution µ over
 ú.
1.2.3 Mechanisms
A mechanism consists of a set of messages Mi for each agent i, a decision rule
p : M æ  K and payment functions ti : M æ R. Each agent i selects a
message from Mi. Based on the resulting profile of messages m, the decision
rule p specifies the outcome from  K (lotteries are allowed) and the payment
5Also see Heifetz and Neeman (2006).
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function ti specifies the transfer from agent i to the mechanism designer. Agent
i obtains utility p · vi ≠ ti. We write pk for the probability that alternative k is
chosen.
The mechanism defines a game form, which together with the type space
constitutes a game of incomplete information. The mechanism design problem
is to fix a solution concept and search for the mechanism that delivers the
maximum expected revenue for the mechanism designer in some outcome
consistent with the solution concept. To implement the Wilson Doctrine and
minimize the role of assumptions built into the naive type space, the common
approach is to adopt a strong solution concept which does not rely on these
assumptions. In practice, the solution concept that is often used for this
purpose is dominant-strategy equilibrium. The revelation principle holds, and
we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms.
Definition 1.1. A direct-relevation mechanism   for type space   is dominant-
strategy incentive compatible (dsIC) if for each agent i and type profile Ê œ  ,
p(Ê) · fi(Êi)≠ ti(Ê) Ø 0, and
p(Ê) · fi(Êi)≠ ti(Ê) Ø p(ÊÕi,Ê≠i) · fi(Êi)≠ ti(ÊÕi,Ê≠i),
for any alternative type ÊÕi œ  i.
Definition 1.2. A dominant-strategy mechanism is a dsIC direct-revelation
10
mechanism for the naive type space  ﬁ. We denote by   the class of all
dominant-strategy mechanisms.
To provide a foundation for using dominant-strategy mechanisms, we shall
compare it to the route of completely eliminating common knowledge assump-
tions about beliefs. We maintain the standard solution concept of Bayesian
equilibrium, but now we enlarge the type space all the way to the universal type
space. By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms.
Definition 1.3. A direct-revelation mechanism   for type space   = ( i, fi, gi)
is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if for each agent i and type Êi œ  i,
⁄
 ≠i
(p(Ê) · fi(Êi)≠ ti(Ê)) gi(Êi)dÊ≠i Ø 0, and⁄
 ≠i
(p(Ê) · fi(Êi)≠ ti(Ê)) gi(Êi)dÊ≠i Ø
⁄
 ≠i
(p(ÊÕi,Ê≠i) · fi(Êi)≠ ti(ÊÕi,Ê≠i)) gi(Êi)dÊ≠i
for any alternative type ÊÕi œ  i.
A mechanism, which does not rely on implicit assumptions about higher-
order beliefs, should be incentive compatible for all belief hierarchies. In other
words, it should be BIC relative to the universal type space.
Definition 1.4. Let   be the class of all BIC direct-revelation mechanism for
the universal type space. We say that such a mechanism is detail free.
For simplicity of exposition, we add a dummy type v0 for each agent i œ I
and set p(v0, v≠i) · vi = ti(v0, v≠i) = 0 for all vi œ Vi, v≠i œ V≠i.
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1.2.4 The mechanism designer as a maxmin decision
maker
The mechanism designer has an estimate of the distribution of the agents’ payo 
types, ﬁ. Following Chung and Ely (2007), we assume that ﬁ has full support.
An assumption µ about the distribution of the payo  types and beliefs of the
agents is consistent with this estimate if the induced marginal distribution on
V is ﬁ. Let M(ﬁ) denote the compact subset of such assumptions. For any







We do not assume that the mechanism designer has confidence in the
naive type space as his model of agents’ beliefs. Rather he considers other
assumptions within the set M(ﬁ) as possible as well. The mechanism designer
who chooses a mechanism that maximizes the worst-case performance solves






If the mechanism designer used a dominant-strategy mechanism, then his













for any dominant-strategy mechanism   œ  .







The use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has a Bayesian foundation if for




The Bayesian foundation is a stronger notion than the maxmin foundation.
The Bayesian foundation says that there exists an assumption about (the
distribution of) agents’ beliefs, against which the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism achieves the highest expected revenue among all detail-free mecha-
nisms. It follows that the worse case expected revenue of an arbitrary detail-free
mechanism cannot exceed its expected revenue against this particular assump-
tion, which in turn cannot exceed the worst-case expected revenue of the
optimal dominant-strategy mechanism. We record this observation as the
following proposition.6
6Also see Chung and Ely (2007, Section 2.5).
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Proposition 1.1. If the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has a Bayesian
foundation, then it has a maxmin foundation.
1.3 Motivating examples
Before we present the results, it is instructive to contrast two bilateral trade
models. In the standard bilateral trade model (see Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983)), whether an agent is the buyer or the seller is exogenously given. Either
the seller sells some units to the buyer or no trade occurs. In the bilateral trade
model with ex ante unidentified traders (see Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer
(1987) and Lu and Robert (2001)), each agent may be either the buyer or
the seller, depending on the realization of the privately observed information
and the choice of the mechanism: the agent’s role as the buyer or the seller is
endogenously determined by her report and cannot be identified prior to trade.
The mechanism designer chooses a mechanism that maximizes the expected
profit in both models.
Section 1.3.1 presents the basics shared by both models. Section 1.3.2
studies the standard bilateral trade model. In this case, the use of dominant-
strategy mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian foundations. Section 1.3.3
studies the bilateral trade model with ex ante unidentified traders. We show
that there is neither a Bayesian foundation nor a maxmin foundation.
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1.3.1 Setup
Consider a broker who chooses trading mechanisms that maximize the expected
profit; see for example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983, Section 5), Lu and
Robert (2001) and Börgers (2015). Each agent is endowed with 12 unit of a
good to be traded and has private information about her valuation for the
good. Agent 1’s valuation for the good could be either 18 or 38. Agent 2’s
valuation for the good could be either 10 or 30. The broker has the following
estimate of the distribution of the agents’ valuations:
v1 = 18 v1 = 38
v2 = 10 38
1
8




1.3.2 Standard bilateral trade
In the standard bilateral trade model, agent 1 is the buyer and agent 2 is the
seller. The trading mechanism is characterized by three outcome functions
(p, t1, t2), where p (v1, v2) is the expected trading amount, t1 (v1, v2) is the
expected payment from agent 1 to the broker and t2 (v1, v2) is the expected
payment from agent 2 to the broker, if v1 and v2 are the reported valuations of
agent 1 and agent 2. Agent 1’s utility from purchasing p units of the good and
paying a transfer t1 is pv1 ≠ t1 and agent 2’s utility from selling p unit of the
good and paying a transfer t2 is ≠pv2 ≠ t2, where 0 Æ p Æ 12 .
15
Clearly, this model belongs to the class of environments with linear utilities
and one-dimensional payo  types; see Section 1.5.1. Following Corollary 1.1, the
use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian foundations.
1.3.3 Bilateral trade with ex ante unidentified traders
In this section, we study the bilateral trade model with ex ante unidentified
traders. Each agent may be either the buyer or the seller. The trading
mechanism is characterized by three outcomes functions (p, tB, tS), where
p (v1, v2) is the expected trading amount, tB (v1, v2) is the expected payment
from the buyer to the broker and tS (v1, v2) is the expected payment from the
seller to the broker, if v1 and v2 are the reported valuations of agent 1 and
agent 2. The buyer’s utility from purchasing p units of the good and paying a
transfer tB is pvB ≠ tB and the seller’s utility from selling p unit of the good
and paying a transfer tS is ≠pvS ≠ tS, where 0 Æ p Æ 12 .
In the context of this economic environment, this example illustrates that,
maxmin/ Bayesian foundations might not exist. Section 1.3.3 calculates the
maximum expected revenue that could be achieved by a dominant-strategy
mechanism, and Section 1.3.3 explicitly constructs a single Bayesian mechanism
that achieves a strictly higher expected revenue, regardless of the assumption
about (the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs. It should be obvious from the
exposition below that this example is robust to small perturbations in the
16
agents’ valuations or the broker’s estimate of the distribution of the payo 
types.
Optimal dominant-strategy mechanism
Using a linear programming solver, we have the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism   as follows, where the first number in each cell indicates the
amount of good agent 1 buys from agent 2, the second number is the transfer
from agent 1 and the third number is the transfer from agent 2. The maximum
expected revenue the mechanism designer can generate from a dominant-
strategy mechanism is 3.
v1 = 18 v1 = 38
v2 = 10 12 , 9,≠5 12 , 9,≠15
v2 = 30 ≠12 ,≠9, 15 12 , 19,≠15
(1.2)
Neither a Bayesian foundation nor a maxmin foundation
To show that there is no maxmin foundation, it su ces to construct a single
Bayesian mechanism and achieve a strictly higher expected revenue than he does
using the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, regardless of the assumption
about (the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs. Since Bayesian foundation is a
stronger notion than maxmin foundation, this further implies that there is no
Bayesian foundation.
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The construction of the mechanism  Õ follows immediately from Theorem
1.2. We shall save the arguments in Section 1.4. Following Chung and Ely
(2007), we use a to denote the first-order belief of a low-valuation type of
agent 2 that agent 1 has low valuation. In this mechanism, the mechanism
designer elicits agent 2’s first-order belief about agent 1’s valuation. To see
that  Õ is expected revenue improving, note that  Õ achieves revenue of at least
4 everywhere and hence the expected revenue is at least 4, regardless of the
agents’ beliefs.
v1 = 18 v1 = 38
a œ [0, 12) ≠12 ,≠9, 15 12 , 19,≠15
a œ [12 , 1] 12 , 9,≠5 12 , 9,≠5
v2 = 30 ≠12 ,≠9, 15 12 , 19,≠15
1.4 Results









ti(v) (DIC ≠ P )
subject to ’i œ I,’vi œ Vi,’vÕi œ {Vi\{vi}} ﬁ {v0},’v≠i œ V≠i,
p(vi, v≠i) · vi ≠ ti(vi, v≠i) Ø p(vÕi, v≠i) · vi ≠ ti(vÕi, v≠i), (1.3)
’v œ V,ÿ
kœK
pk(v) = 1. (1.4)
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By compactness arguments, the maximization problem (DIC ≠ P ) has a
finite optimal value. Denote by VDIC≠P the value of the objective function of
the program (DIC ≠ P ) at an optimum.
Say that a decision rule p is dsIC if there exists transfer scheme t such that
the mechanism (p, t) satisfies the incentive constraints (1.3). We omit the proof
of the following standard lemma, due to Rochet (1987).
Lemma 1.1. A necessary and su cient condition for a decision rule p to be
dsIC is the following cyclical monotonicity condition: ’i œ I,’v≠i œ V≠i and




[p(vi,Ÿ, v≠i) · vi,Ÿ+1 ≠ p(vi,Ÿ, v≠i) · vi,Ÿ] Æ 0. (1.5)
1.4.1 Uniform shortest-path tree
We first collect some graph-theoretic terminology used in the sequal.
Definition 1.6. Fix a decision rule p that is dsIC and other agents’ reports
v≠i.7 (1) The set of nodes for agent i is Vi ﬁ {v0}; (2) For any vi œ Vi and vÕi œ
Vi\{vi}ﬁ{v0}, vÕi æ vi is a directed edge with length p(vi, v≠i) ·vi≠p(vÕi, v≠i) ·vi;
and (3) A path from the dummy type v0 to payo  type vi,k œ Vi is a sequence
P = (v0, vi,1, vi,2, ..., vi,k) where (i) vi,j œ Vi,’j = 1, 2, ..., k; (ii) v0 æ vi,1; (iii)
7In the remainder of this section, whenever we fix a decision rule p, we mean a decision
rule p that is dsIC.
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vi,j≠1 æ vi,j,’j = 2, ..., k and (iv) j ”= jÕ =∆ vi,j ”= vi,jÕ.
To understand the maximization problem (DIC ≠ P ) and in particular
the associated incentive constraints (1.3), it helps to flip to its dual. The
dual is a network flow problem that can be described in the following way.
Fix a decision rule p and other agents’ reports v≠i. Introduce one node for
each type vi œ Vi ﬁ {v0} (the node corresponding to the dummy type v0
will be the source) and to each directed edge vÕi æ vi, assign a length of
p(vi, v≠i) · vi ≠ p(vÕi, v≠i) · vi. The optimization problem reduces to determining
the shortest-path tree (the union of all shortest-paths from the source to all
nodes) in this network. Edges on the shortest-path tree correspond to binding
dominant-strategy incentive constraints. Readers unfamiliar with network flows
may consult Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993) and Vohra (2011).
Definition 1.7. Fix a decision rule p and other agents’ reports v≠i. A shortest-
path tree is the union of all shortest-paths from the source to all nodes.
Note that if vÕi belongs to the shortest-path from the source v0 to some vi œ
Vi, the truncation of the path from v0 to vÕi defines the shortest-path from v0
to vÕi.
Definition 1.8. There is uniform shortest-path tree if for each agent i œ I,
there is the same shortest-path tree for all decision rules p and other agents’
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reports v≠i.
When the uniform shortest-path tree condition is satisfied, we drop the
dependence on p, v≠i. Uniform shortest-path tree induces an order on the
agents’ payo  types. For a typical shortest-path (v0, vi,1, vi,2, ..., vi,k) of the
shortest-path tree, we write vi,k ºi vi,k≠1 ºi . . . ºi vi,1 ºi v0. It is convenient
to represent the uniform shortest-path tree of agent i using ºi and its transitive
closure by º+i . For notational convenience, write vÕi ≤+i vi if vÕi º+i vi or vÕi = vi.
If vi ºi vÕi , we sometimes write v≠i = vÕi.
With the uniform shortest-path tree, the rent of any payo  type can be
easily calculated and all incentive constraints can be replaced by the cyclical
monotonicity constraints on the decision rule. We record this as the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.2. With the uniform shortest-path tree ºi, the maximization










SWUp(vi, v≠i) · vi ≠ ÿ
vÕiœVi:vi≤+i vÕi
p((vÕi)≠, v≠i) · (vÕi ≠ (vÕi)≠)
TXV ,
(1.6)
subject to p(·) satisfies the cyclical monotonicity constraint (1.5).
Proof. With the uniform shortest-path tree ºi, for any p and v≠i, the rent of
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payo  type vi of agent i can be calculated as follows:
Ui(vi, v≠i) = p(vi, v≠i) · vi ≠ ti(vi, v≠i)
= p(v≠i , v≠i) · vi ≠ ti(v≠i , v≠i)
= p(v≠i , v≠i) · v≠i ≠ ti(v≠i , v≠i) + p(v≠i , v≠i) · (vi ≠ v≠i )





p((vÕi)≠, v≠i) · (vÕi ≠ (vÕi)≠).
Therefore,
ti(vi, v≠i) = p(vi, v≠i) · vi ≠ Ui(vi, v≠i)
= p(vi, v≠i) · vi ≠
ÿ
vÕiœVi:vi≤+i vÕi
p((vÕi)≠, v≠i) · (vÕi ≠ (vÕi)≠).










SWUp(vi, v≠i) · vi ≠ ÿ
vÕiœVi:vi≤+i vÕi
p((vÕi)≠, v≠i) · (vÕi ≠ (vÕi)≠)
TXV .
By Lemma 1.1, p(·) is subject to the cyclical monotonicity constraint
(1.5).
Definition 1.9. Say ﬁ is regular if the cyclical monotonicity constraint (1.5)
is automatically satisfied for pú that maximizes the reduced objective function
(1.6).
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal definition of regularity in
the general environments. Our definition of regularity captures how it has been
used in the literature; see for example, Myerson (1981).8 In the applications
we study in Section 1.5.1 and Section 1.5.2, additional structure is imposed
and we provide primitive condition for regularity.
1.4.2 Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
Theorem 1.1. In environments in which the uniform shortest-path tree condi-
tion holds, if ﬁ is regular, then the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has
maxmin and Bayesian foundations.
Proof. The structure of the proof is as follows. Step 1) considers the optimal
dominant-strategy mechanism design problem (DIC ≠ P ) and derives its
dual (DIC ≠ D). Step 2) restricts attention to a subclass of type spaces,
formulates the Bayesian mechanism design problem (BIC ≠ P ) and derives
its dual (BIC ≠D). Denote by VDIC≠D (resp. VBIC≠P and VBIC≠D) the value
of the objective function of the program (DIC ≠D) (resp. (BIC ≠ P ) and
(BIC ≠D)) at an optimum. Step 3) then explicitly constructs an assumption
about (the distribution of) the agents’ beliefs, against which we show in Step
8That is, we first ask which decision rule p the mechanism designer would choose if
she does not have to make sure that the decision rule p satisfies the cyclical monotonicity
constraint. The regularity condition is then imposed to make sure that such optimal decision
rule p automatically satisfies the cyclical monotonicity constraint.
23
4) that, VDIC≠D Ø VBIC≠D. It follows from the duality theorem in linear
programming (see for example, Bradley, Hax, and Magnanti (1977, Chapter
4)) that VDIC≠P = VDIC≠D Ø VBIC≠D Ø VBIC≠P .
Step 1) First consider the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism design
problem (DIC ≠ P ). We derive its dual (DIC ≠D), where ⁄DIC(vÕi; vi, v≠i) is
the multiplier associated with the incentive constraint (1.3) and µDIC(v) is the












⁄DIC(vi; vÕi, v≠i) = ﬁ(vi, v≠i), (1.7)









⁄DIC(vi; vÕi, v≠i)(vi(k)≠ vÕi(k)) Æ µDIC(v), (1.8)
’i œ I,’vi œ Vi,’vÕi œ {Vi\{vi}} ﬁ {v0},’v≠i œ V≠i,
⁄DIC(vÕi; vi, v≠i) Ø 0. (1.9)
As ⁄DIC(vÕi; vi, v≠i) is the multiplier for the incentive constraint (1.3), by the
uniform shortest-path tree and regularity, there is a dual optimum satisfying
⁄DIC(vÕi; vi, v≠i) > 0 only if vi ºi vÕi,
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and (1.7) simplifies to
⁄DIC(v≠i ; vi, v≠i)≠
ÿ
vÕi:vÕiºivi
⁄DIC(vi; vÕi, v≠i) = ﬁ(vi, v≠i).
By induction,
⁄DIC(vÕi; vi, v≠i) =
Y][
q
vˆi:vˆi≤+i vi ﬁ(vˆi, v≠i); if vi ºi vÕi;
0; otherwise.
(1.10)
Step 2) Say that a type space is simple if for each agent i œ I and payo 
type vi œ Vi, there is a unique type for agent i with valuation vi. Let the set of
types for agent i be equal to the set of possible valuations, i.e.  i = Vi. We
take fi to be the identity, and for notational ease, we will write ·i(·|vi) = gi(vi)
for the belief of type vi of agent i about the types of the other agents. From
now on, we restrict attention to such type spaces.









ti(v) (BIC ≠ P )
subject to ’i œ I,’vi œ Vi,’vÕi œ {Vi\{vi}} ﬁ {v0},
ÿ
v≠iœV≠i
·i(v≠i|vi)(p(vi, v≠i) · vi ≠ ti(vi, v≠i))
Ø ÿ
v≠iœV≠i
·i(v≠i|vi)(p(vÕi, v≠i) · vi ≠ ti(vÕi, v≠i)), (1.11)
’v œ V,ÿ
kœK
pk(v) = 1. (1.12)
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We derive the dual minimization problem (BIC ≠D), where ⁄BIC(vÕi; vi) is
the multiplier for the incentive constraint (1.11) and µBIC(v) is the multiplier












⁄BIC(vi; vÕi)·i(v≠i|vÕi) = ﬁ(vi, v≠i),
(1.13)









⁄BIC(vi; vÕi)·i(v≠i|vÕi)(vi(k)≠ vÕi(k)) Æ µBIC(v),
(1.14)
’i œ I,’vi œ Vi,’vÕi œ {Vi\{vi}} ﬁ {v0},
⁄BIC(vÕi; vi) Ø 0. (1.15)
Step 3) Now we construct a particular assumption about (the distribution

















Step 4) Fix any feasible dual variables ⁄DIC(vÕi; vi, v≠i) and µDIC(v) of the





and µBIC(v) = µDIC(v).


















where the second equality follows from (1.10), the third equality follows from
(1.16), and the last equality follows from (1.17). Otherwise,
⁄BIC(vÕi; vi)·i(v≠i|vi) = 0.
In either case, we have
⁄BIC(vÕi; vi)·i(v≠i|vi) = ⁄DIC(vÕi; vi, v≠i). (1.18)
We now show that the dual variables ⁄BIC(vÕi; vi) and µBIC(v) are feasible
under the minimization problem (BIC ≠D). (1.15) are trivially satisfied. It
follows from (1.18) that (1.13) reduces to (1.7), and (1.14) reduces to (1.8).
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Since ⁄DIC(vÕi; vi, v≠i) and µDIC(v) are feasible under the problem (DIC ≠D),
⁄BIC(vÕi; vi) and µBIC(v) are feasible under the minimization problem (BIC ≠
D). Furthermore, the value of the objective function of the minimization
problem (BIC ≠ D) is qvœV µBIC(v) = qvœV µDIC(v). We conclude that
VDIC≠D Ø VBIC≠D.
1.4.3 No foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
This subsection considers violations of the uniform shortest-path tree condition.
When the uniform shortest-path tree condition is not satisfied, as illustrated
in the bilateral trade model with ex ante unidentified traders (Section 1.3.3),
maxmin/ Bayesian foundations might not exist. In particular, we explicitly
construct a single Bayesian mechanism that does strictly better than the
optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, regardless of the assumption about (the
distribution of) the agents’ beliefs.
In environments where the uniform shortest path is violated, it is di -
cult to find the optimal dominant-strategy mechanisms, not to mention the
construction of the superior Bayesian mechanism. To have a meaningful dis-
cussion, we shall take the optimal dominant-strategy mechanisms (the binding
structure, and payments of the agents) as primitives. While the conditions
of the theorem may be restrictive, the conditions can be verified whenever
the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism can be solved (possibly by a linear
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programming solver). In addition to bilateral trade with ex ante unidentified
traders, the result can also be applied to auction with type-dependent outside
option (Section 1.5.3).
Theorem 1.2. In environments with two agents and binary payo  types for
each agent, for the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, if
v1 vÕ1
v2 p(v1, v2), t1(v1, v2), t2(v1, v2) p(v1, v2), t1(vÕ1, v2), t2(vÕ1, v2)
vÕ2 p(v1, vÕ2), t1(v1, vÕ2), t2(v1, vÕ2) p(v1, v2), t1(vÕ1, vÕ2), t2(vÕ1, vÕ2)
1) binding structure:
p(v1, vÕ2) · v2 ≠ t2(v1, vÕ2) < 0,
and p(vÕ1, vÕ2) · v2 ≠ t2(vÕ1, vÕ2) > 0;
2) payment dominance:
t1(v1, vÕ2) + t2(v1, vÕ2) Ø t1(v1, v2) + t2(v1, v2),
and t1(vÕ1, vÕ2) + t2(vÕ1, vÕ2) > t1(vÕ1, v2) + t2(vÕ1, v2),
then there is neither a Bayesian foundation nor a maxmin foundation.
Remark 1.1. For ease of exposition, we state Theorem 1.2 in environments
with two agents and binary payo  types for each agent. The argument extends
29
to environments with multiple agents and each agent has multiple payo  types,
as long as there are two agents and two payo  types for each agent, where the
structure as stated in Theorem 1.2 exists.
Proof. Let
x = p(v1, v2) · v2 ≠ t2(v1, v2);
y = p(vÕ1, v2) · v2 ≠ t2(vÕ1, v2);
z = p(v1, vÕ2) · v2 ≠ t2(v1, vÕ2) < 0;
w = p(vÕ1, vÕ2) · v2 ≠ t2(vÕ1, vÕ2) > 0.
Since the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism necessarily satisfy the incentive
constraints, we have x Ø 0, y Ø w > 0.9
We show that there is no maxmin foundation. That is, the mechanism
designer could employ a single Bayesian mechanism and achieve a strictly higher
expected revenue than he does using the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism,
regardless of the agents’ beliefs. To do this, we first explicitly identify one
such mechanism and proceed by verifying i) the mechanism is BIC for the
universal type space; and ii) this mechanism achieves a strictly higher expected
revenue regardless of the agents’ beliefs. Since the Bayesian foundation is a
9As a matter of fact, it must be that x = 0, and y = w. Otherwise, the dominant-strategy
mechanism would not have been optimal. Note that the uniform shortest-path tree condition
is violated.
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stronger notion than the maxmin foundation, this further implies that there is
no Bayesian foundation.
We use a to denote the first-order belief of payo  type v2 of agent 2 that
agent 1 has payo  type v1. In this mechanism, the mechanism designer elicits
agent 2’s first-order belief about agent 1’s payo  type. Consider the following
Bayesian mechanism  Õ:
v1 vÕ1
v2, a œ [0, ww≠z ) p(v1, vÕ2), t1(v1, vÕ2), t2(v1, vÕ2) p(vÕ1, vÕ2), t1(vÕ1, vÕ2), t2(vÕ1, vÕ2)
v2, a œ [ ww≠z , 1] p(v1, v2), t1(v1, v2), t2(v1, v2) + x p(vÕ1, v2), t1(vÕ1, v2), t2(vÕ1, v2) + y
vÕ2 p(v1, vÕ2), t1(v1, vÕ2), t2(v1, vÕ2) p(vÕ1, vÕ2), t1(vÕ1, vÕ2), t2(vÕ1, vÕ2)
To see that  Õ is BIC for the universal type space, note that
i truth telling continues to be a dominant strategy for agent 1;
ii truth telling continues to be a dominant strategy for payo  type vÕ2 of agent
2;
iii a œ [0, ww≠z ) will not announce vÕ2 as utility is unchanged;
iv a œ [ ww≠z , 1] will not announce vÕ2 as expected utility is lower; and
v between a œ [0, ww≠z ) and a œ [ ww≠z , 1], payo  type v2 of agent 2 will announce
a œ [ ww≠z , 1] if and only if a œ [ ww≠z , 1].
To see that the mechanism achieves a strictly higher expected revenue than
the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism, regardless of the assumption about
(the distribution of) the agents’ belief, note that
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vi t1(v1, vÕ2) + t2(v1, vÕ2) Ø t1(v1, v2) + t2(v1, v2);
vii t1(vÕ1, vÕ2) + t2(vÕ1, vÕ2) > t1(vÕ1, v2) + t2(vÕ1, v2);
viii x Ø 0 and y Ø w > 0.
1.5 Applications
This section is devoted to the applications of the results. The uniform shortest-
path tree condition holds in the standard social choice environment with linear
utilities and one-dimensional payo  types as well as some multi-dimensional
environments. Section 1.5.1 applies our result to environments with linear utili-
ties and one-dimensional types, and Section 1.5.2 considers a multi-dimensional
environment. For both applications, we provide primitive conditions for regu-
larity. As we illustrated in Section 1.3, Theorem 1.2 can be applied to bilateral
trade with ex ante unidentified traders. Section 1.5.3 applies Theorem 1.2 to
another environment, namely, auction with type-dependent outside option.
1.5.1 Linear utilities and one-dimensional payo  types
In this subsection, we consider the standard social choice environment with
linear utilities and one-dimensional payo  types.10 This fits many classical
10This set-up covers the environment studied in Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu,
and Shi (2013, Section 2).
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applications of mechanism design, including single-unit auction (e.g., Myerson
(1981)), public good (e.g., Mailath and Postlewaite (1990)) and standard
bilateral trade (e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
There is a finite set I = {1, 2, ..., I} of risk neutral agents and a finite set
K = {1, 2, ..., K} of social alternatives. Agent i’s gross utility in alternative k
equals uki (vi) = aki vi, where vi œ R is agent i’s payo  type, aki œ R are constants
and aki Ø 0 for all k. Agent i obtains utility
p(v) · Aivi ≠ ti(v)
for decision rule p œ  K and transfer ti, where Ai = (a1i , a2i , ..., aKi ). For
notational simplicity, we assume that each agent has M possible payo  types
and that the set Vi is the same for each agent: Vi = {v1, v2, ..., vM}, where
vm ≠ vm≠1 = “ for each m and some “ > 0.










subject to ’i œ I,’m, l = 1, 2, ...,M, ’v≠i œ V≠i,
p(vm, v≠i) · Aivm ≠ ti(vm, v≠i) Ø 0, (1.19)
p(vm, v≠i) · Aivm ≠ ti(vm, v≠i) Ø p(vl, v≠i) · Aivm ≠ ti(vl, v≠i). (1.20)
In the environment with linear utilities and one-dimensional payo  types,
33
we say that a decision rule p is dsIC if there exists transfer scheme t such that
the mechanism (p, t) satisfies the constraints (1.19) and (1.20).
Uniform shortest-path tree condition is naturally satisfied in such settings.
In particular, for any agent i œ I, the payo  types are completely ordered via
a single path. We omit the proof of the following standard lemma.
Lemma 1.2. Fix any decision rule p that is dsIC, the shortest path from the
source v0 to any payo  type vm œ Vi is P = (v0, v1, v2, ..., vm) and
ti(vm, v≠i) = p(vm, v≠i) · Aivm ≠ “
m≠1ÿ
mÕ=1
p(vmÕ , v≠i) · Ai.
Next, we present the primitive condition for regularity. It is well known









subject to ’i œ I,’m, l = 1, 2, ...,M, ’v≠i œ V≠i,
p(v1, v≠i) · Aiv1 ≠ ti(v1, v≠i) = 0,
p(vm, v≠i) · Aivm ≠ ti(vm, v≠i) = p(vm≠1, v≠i) · Aivm ≠ ti(vm≠1, v≠i),
p(vm, v≠i) · Ai Ø p(vl, v≠i) · Ai, for m Ø l.
Let Fi(vi, v≠i) =
q
vˆiÆvi ﬁ(vˆi, v≠i) denote the cumulative distribution func-
tion of i’s valuation conditional on the other agents having payo  type profile
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v≠i. Define the virtual valuation of agent i as
ri(v) = vi ≠ “ 1≠ Fi(v)
ﬁ(v) ,


















For each alternative k, let Kk,infi = {kÕ œ K : akÕi < aki }. That is, Kk,infi is
the collection of alternatives that agent i considers inferior to alternative k.
Definition 1.10. We say that ﬁ is regular if the virtual valuations satisfy the









aki ri(vˆj, v≠j) = ÿ (1.22)
for every vˆj > vj.
We establish the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms in Corollary
1.1.
Corollary 1.1. If ﬁ satisfies the regularity condition (1.22), the use of dominant-
strategy mechanisms has a Bayesian/ maxmin foundation.







Regularity condition (1.22) ensures that for any alternative k chosen with
positive probability for payo  type profile (vl, v≠i), when agent i’s payo  type
increases say from vl to vm, alternatives that are inferior than alternative k
from agent i’s point of view will not be chosen. It must be that p(vm, v≠i) ·Ai Ø
p(vl, v≠i) · Ai, for m Ø l. It is well known that this is equivalent to cyclical
monotonicity in environments with linear utilities and one-dimensional payo 
types. The uniform shortest-path tree condition follows from Lemma 1.2. The
result then follows from Theorem 1.1.
1.5.2 Multi-unit auction with capacity-constrained bid-
ders
In addition to environments with linear utilities and one-dimensional payo 
types, the uniform shortest-path tree condition is also satisfied in some multi-
dimensional environments. Solving for the optimal mechanism in a multi-
dimensional environment is in general a daunting task. In this section, we
examine a specific case where the multi-dimensional analysis can be simplified.
Consider the problem of finding the revenue maximizing auction when
bidders have constant marginal valuations as well as capacity constraints.11
Both the marginal values and capacity constraints are private information to
the bidders. Bidder i’s payo  type is represented by vi = (a, b), where a is
11Malakhov and Vohra (2009) studies the optimal Bayesian mechanism in such an envi-
ronment, assuming independent types.
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the maximum amount she is willing to pay for each unit and b is the largest
number of units she seeks. Units beyond the bth unit are worthless. Let the
range of a be A = {1, 2, ..., A} and the range of b be B = {1, 2, ..., B}. The
seller has Q units to sell.
A crucial assumption is that bidders cannot inflate the capacity but can
shade it down. In other words, the auctioneer can verify, partially, the claims
made by a bidder. Although this assumption seems odd in the selling context,
it is natural in a procurement setting. Consider a procurement auction where
the auctioneer wishes to procure Q units from bidders with constant marginal
costs and limited capacity. No bidder will inflate his capacity when bidding
because of the huge penalties associated with not being able to fulfill the order.
Equivalently, we may suppose that the mechanism designer can verify that
claims that exceed capacity are false.
Lemma 1.3. Fix any decision rule p that is dsIC, the shortest-path from the
source v0 to any payo  type (a, b) is
(a, b) ºi (a≠ 1, b) ºi ... ºi (1, b) ºi (1, b≠ 1) ºi ... ºi (1, 1) ºi v0.
Let Fb,v≠i(a) =
qa
x=1 ﬁ((x, b), v≠i).




3,1 2,1 1,1 v0








then the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian
foundations.
The proof of Lemma 1.3 and the derivation of the regularity condition (1.23)
is a straightforward extension of Malakhov and Vohra (2009) and omitted.
When ﬁ is independent, the regularity condition (1.23) reduces to the regularity
condition in Malakhov and Vohra (2009). Corollary 1.2 then follows from
Theorem 1.1.
1.5.3 Auction with type-dependent outside option
Besides the bilateral trade model with ex ante unidentified traders (Section 1.3),
we present here another environment to illustrate the usefulness of Theorem 1.2.
A single unit of an indivisible object is up for sale. There are two risk-neutral
38
bidders. Each bidder’s payo  type is represented by (a, b) œ R2+ where a is
the maximum amount she is willing to pay and b is the value of her outside
option. Bidder 1’s private information could be either (20, 0) or (40, 5). Bidder
2’s private information could be either (10, 0) or (30, 5). The auctioneer has
the following estimate of the distribution of the agents’ valuations:
v1 = (20, 0) v1 = (40, 5)
v2 = (10, 0) 38
1
8




The optimal dominant-strategy mechanism   is as follows, where the first
number in each cell indicates the probability that agent 1 gets the object, the
second number is the probability that agent 2 gets the object, the third number
is the transfer from agent 1 to the auctioneer and the fourth number is the
transfer from agent 2 to the auctioneer. Following Theorem 1.2, there is neither
a Bayesian foundation nor a maxmin foundation.
v1 = (20, 0) v1 = (40, 5)
v2 = (10, 0) 1, 0, 20, 0 1, 0, 20,≠5




1.6.1 Foundations of ex post incentive-compatible mech-
anisms
Our paper focuses on the private-value setting. The uniform shortest-path tree
condition has a natural counterpart in the interdependent-value setting that,
under an additional regularity condition, ensures the maxmin and Bayesian
foundations of ex post incentive-compatible mechanisms. Indeed, in an inde-
pendent and contemporaneous work, Yamashita and Zhu (2014) study the
so-called “digital-goods” auctions in the interdependent-value setting. They
show that under “ordinal invariability” (which entails that each agent has a
stable preference ordering over all her payo  types, regardless of what payo 
type profile the other agents have) and additional assumptions, the use of ex
post incentive-compatible mechanisms has maxmin and Bayesian foundations.
1.6.2 On the notion of the maxmin foundation
Börgers (2013) argues that the maxmin foundation requires too little of an
optimal mechanism. For every dominant-strategy mechanism, Börgers con-
structs another mechanism which never yields lower revenue and sometimes
yields strictly higher revenue. The construction builds on the possibility of side
bets among agents, and the mechanism designer charges a small fee for each
bet. As Börgers points out, the argument would not be valid i) if agents could
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arrange side bets without requiring the mechanism designer as an intermediary;
and ii) if the mechanism designer restricts her attention to the type spaces
characterized by Morris (1994), which do not allow speculative trade.
We view the maxmin foundation as the minimum requirement that the
optimal mechanism needs to satisfy. Indeed, if the use of dominant-strategy
mechanisms does not have a maxmin foundation, then by definition, there exists
a single Bayesian mechanism that achieves strictly higher expected revenue
for every assumption about the agents’ beliefs. Consequently, it becomes
problematic to rationalize the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. In settings
in which the uniform shortest-path tree condition is violated, dominant-strategy




Equivalence of Stochastic and
Deterministic Mechanisms
2.1 Introduction
Myerson (1981) provides the framework that has become the paradigm for the
study of optimal auction design. Under a “regularity” condition, the optimal
auction allocates the object to the bidder with the highest “virtual value”,
provided that this virtual value is above the seller’s opportunity cost. In other
words, the optimal auction in Myerson’s setting is deterministic.1
A natural conjecture is that the optimality of deterministic mechanisms
generalizes beyond Myerson’s setting. McAfee and McMillan (1988, Section
4) claim that under a general regularity condition on consumers’ demand,
stochastic delivery was not optimal for a multi-product monopolist. However,
1Also see Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) who consider a one-good monopolist selling to a
population of consumers with unit demand and show that lotteries do not help the one-good
monopolist.
42
this result has been proven to be incorrect with a single agent. Several papers
have shown that a multi-product monopolist may find it beneficial to include
lotteries as part of the selling mechanism; see for example, Thanassoulis (2004),
Manelli and Vincent (2006, 2007), Pycia (2006), Pavlov (2011), and more
recently, Hart and Reny (2015), and Rochet and Thanassoulis (2015).2 In this
paper, we restore the optimality of deterministic mechanisms in remarkably
general environments with multiple agents.
We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents,
a finite set of alternatives, and independent and dispersed information.3 We
show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an
equivalent deterministic mechanism that i) is Bayesian incentive compatible; ii)
delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim
expected utilities for all agents; and iii) delivers the same ex ante expected
social surplus. In addition to the standard social choice environments with
linear utilities and one-dimensional, private types, our result holds in settings
with a rich class of utility functions, multi-dimensional types, interdependent
valuations, and non-transferable utilities.
2In environments in which di erent types are associated with di erent risk attitudes,
it is known that stochastic mechanisms may perform better; see for example, La ont and
Martimort (2002, p. 67) and Strausz (2006).
3Throughout this paper, we say that an agent has “dispersed information” if her type
distribution is atomless.
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Our result implies that any mechanism, including the optimal mechanisms
(whether in terms of revenue or e ciency), can be implemented using a deter-
ministic mechanism and nothing can be gained from designing more intricate
mechanisms with possibly more complex randomization. As pointed out in
Hart and Reny (2015, p. 912), Aumann commented that it is surprising that
randomization can not increase revenue when there is only one good. Indeed,
aforementioned papers in the screening literature establish that randomization
helps when there are multiple goods. Nevertheless, we show that in general
social choice environment with multiple agents, the revenue maximizing mech-
anism can always be deterministically implemented. This is in sharp contrast
with the results in the screening literature.
Our result also has important implications beyond the revenue contrast.
The mechanism design literature essentially builds on the assumption that a
mechanism designer can credibly commit to any outcome of a mechanism. This
requirement implies that any outcome of the mechanism must be verifiable
before it can be employed. In this vein, a stochastic mechanism demands not
only that a randomization device be available to the mechanism designer, but
also that the outcome of the randomization device be objectively verified. As
noted in La ont and Martimort (2002, p. 67), “Ensuring this verifiability
is a more di cult problem than ensuring that a deterministic mechanism is
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enforced, because any deviation away from a given randomization can only
be statistically detected once su ciently many realizations of the contracts
have been observed. ... The enforcement of such stochastic mechanisms is
thus particularly problematic. This has led scholars to give up those random
mechanisms or, at least, to focus on economic settings where they are not opti-
mal.”4 Our result implies that every mechanism can in fact be deterministically
implemented, and thereby irons out the conceptual di culties associated with
stochastic mechanisms.
This paper joins the strand of literature that studies mechanism equivalence.
Though motivations vary, these results show that it is without loss of generality
to consider the various subclasses of mechanisms. As in the case of dominant-
strategy mechanisms (see Manelli and Vincent (2010) and Gershkov, Goeree,
Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013)) and symmetric auctions (see Deb and Pai
(2015)), our findings imply that the requirement of deterministic mechanisms is
not restrictive in itself.5 In this sense, our result provides a foundation for the
use of deterministic allocations in mechanism design settings such as auctions,
4Also see Bester and Strausz (2001) and Strausz (2003).
5Manelli and Vincent (2010) show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible auction,
there exists an equivalent dominant-strategy incentive compatible auction that yields the
same interim expected utilities for all agents. Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and
Shi (2013) extend this equivalence result to social choice environments with linear utilities
and independent, one-dimensional, private types; also see Footnote 12 for related discussion.
Deb and Pai (2015) show that restricting the seller to a using symmetric auction imposes
virtually no restriction on her ability to achieve discriminatory outcomes.
45
bilateral trades, and so on.
In order to prove the existence of an equivalent deterministic mechanism,
we develop a new methodology of “mutual purification”, and establish its link
with the literature of mechanism design.6 The notion of mutual purification is
both conceptually and technically di erent from the usual purification principle
in the literature related to Bayesian games. We shall clarify these two di erent
notions of purification in the next three paragraphs.
It follows from the general purification principle in Dvoretzky, Wald, and
Wolfowitz (1950) that any behavioral-strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite-
action Bayesian game with independent and dispersed information corresponds
to some pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium with the same payo .7 In
particular, independent and dispersed information allows the agents to replace
their behavioral strategies by some equivalent pure strategies one-by-one.8 The
point is that under the independent information assumption, any agent who
has dispersed information could purify her own behavioral strategy regardless
whether other agents have dispersed information. Example 2.2 illustrates this
6Some of our technical results extend the corresponding mathematical results in Arkin
and Levin (1972); see the Appendices for more detailed discussion.
7See Radner and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Khan, Rath, and
Sun (2006). Furthermore, by applying the purification idea to a sequence of Bayesian
games, Harsanyi (1973) provided an interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibrium in complete
information games; see Govindan, Reny, and Robson (2003) and Morris (2008) for more
discussion.
8See the proof of Theorem 1 in Khan, Rath, and Sun (2006).
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idea of “self purification”. Given a behavioral-strategy Nash equilibrium in a
2-agent Bayesian game with independent information, there is an equivalent
pure strategy for the agent with dispersed information, while the other agent
with an atom in her type space could not purify her behavioral strategy.
In contrast, the purification result of this paper is based on the dispersed
information associated with the other agents. Example 2.3 partially illustrates
this idea of “mutual purification”. For a given randomized mechanism in
a 2-agent setting with independent information, the agent with an atom in
her type space can achieve the same interim payo  by some deterministic
mechanism, while there does not exist such a deterministic mechanism for the
other agent with dispersed information. In other words, our result becomes
possible because each agent relies on the dispersed information of the other
agents rather than her own. This also explains why a similar result does not
hold in the one-agent setting since there is no dispersed information from other
agents for such a single agent to purify the relevant randomized mechanism.
In addition, we emphasize that in the multiple-agent setting, the notion of
“mutual purification” requires not only that each agent obtain the same interim
payo  under some deterministic mechanism, but also that a single deterministic
mechanism deliver the same interim payo s for all the agents simultaneously.
From a methodological point of view, the general purification principle in
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Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz (1950) is simply a version of the classical
Lyapunov Theorem about the convex range of an atomless finite-dimensional
vector measure. Our purification result is technically di erent. First, the
problem we consider is infinite-dimensional because we require the same ex-
pected allocation probabilities/ utilities for the equivalent mechanism at the
interim level with a continuum of types. Note that Lyapunov’s Theorem fails
in an infinite-dimensional setting.9 Second, it is clearly impossible to obtain a
purified deterministic mechanism that delivers the same expected allocation
probabilities as the original stochastic mechanism, conditioned on the joint
types of all the agents.10 However, our result on mutual purification shows
that such an equivalence becomes possible when the conditioning operation
is imposed on the individual types of every agent simultaneously, although
the combination of the individual types of every agent is the joint types of all
the agents. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to consider
the purification of a randomized decision rule that retains the same expected
payo s conditioned on the individual types of every agent in an economic
model.
Our paper contributes to the Bayesian mechanism design literature in relying
9See, for example, Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 261).
10Since the joint types of all the agents carry the full information, the expected allocation
probability of a stochastic mechanism conditioned on the joint types is simply the stochastic
mechanism itself.
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on specific aspects of agents’ private information. These information aspects are
often crucial in pinning down di erent properties of the optimal mechanism. For
instance, agents with independent types retain information rents (see Myerson
(1981)), whereas the mechanism designer can fully extract the surplus when
the agents’ types are correlated (see Crémer and McLean (1988)). Our result
builds on the assumption that the agents’ private information is independent
and dispersed. This assumption facilitates the development of the novel
methodology of “mutual purification”, which lies at the core of our arguments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
basics. Section 2.3 illustrates our equivalence notion and the idea of “mutual
purification” through examples. Section 2.4 presents the equivalence result.
Section 2.5 discusses the benefit of randomness, an implementation perspective
of our result, and various assumptions of our result. Section 2.6 concludes. The
appendix contains proofs omitted from the main body of the paper.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Notation
There is a finite set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of risk neutral agents with I Ø 2 and
a finite set K = {1, 2, ..., K} of social alternatives. The set of possible types
Vi of agent i is a closed subset of finite dimensional Euclidean space Rl with
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generic element vi. The set of possible type profiles is V © V1 ◊ V2 ◊ · · ·◊ VI
with generic element v = (v1, v2, . . . , vI). Write v≠i for a type profile of agent
i’s opponents; that is, v≠i œ V≠i =  j ”=iVj. Denote by ⁄ the common prior
distribution on V . For each i œ I,⁄i is the marginal distribution of ⁄ on Vi
and is assumed to be atomless. Throughout this paper, types are assumed to
be independent.11 If (Y,Y) is a measurable space, then  Y is the set of all
probability measures on (Y,Y). If Y is a metric space, then we treat it as a
measurable space with its Borel ‡-algebra.
2.2.2 Mechanism
The revelation principle applies, and we restrict attention to direct mechanisms
characterized by K + I functions, {qk(v)}kœK and {ti(v)}iœI , where v is the
profile of reports, qk(v) Ø 0 is the probability that alternative k is implemented
with qkœK qk(v) = 1, and ti(v) is the monetary transfer that agent i makes to
the mechanism designer. Agent i’s gross utility in alternative k is uki (vi, v≠i).





for the interim expected allocation probability (from agent i’s perspective) that
11Note that we do not make any assumption regarding the correlation of the di erent
coordinates of type vi for any i œ I.
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for the interim expected transfer from agent i to the mechanism designer. Agent













uki (vi, v≠i)qk(vi, v≠i)
TV⁄≠i(dv≠i)≠ Ti(vi).
A mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if for each agent i œ I
and each type vi œ Vi,






uki (vi, v≠i)qk(vÕi, v≠i)≠ ti(vÕi, v≠i)
TV⁄≠i(dv≠i)
for any alternative type vÕi œ Vi.
A mechanism (q, t) is said to be “deterministic” if for almost all type profiles,
the mechanism implements some alternative k for sure. That is, for ⁄-almost
all v œ V, qk (v) = 1 for some 1 Æ k Æ K.
2.2.3 Mechanism equivalence
We shall employ the following notion of mechanism equivalence.
Definition 2.1. Two mechanisms (q, t) and (q˜, t˜) are equivalent if and only
if they deliver the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same
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interim expected utilities for all agents, and the same ex ante expected social
surplus.
Remark 2.1. Our equivalence is stronger than the prevailing mechanism
equivalence notion. For example, Manelli and Vincent (2010) and Gershkov,
Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013) define two mechanisms to be
equivalent if they deliver the same interim expected utilities for all agents and
the same ex ante expected social surplus.12
Remark 2.2. The equivalent deterministic mechanism also guarantees the
same ex post monetary transfers, and hence the same expected revenue; see
Theorem 2.1.
2.3 Examples
2.3.1 An illustration of equivalent deterministic mecha-
nism
In the first example, we illustrate our mechanism equivalence notion in a
single-unit auction environment.13 The example is kept deliberately simple
and its only purpose is to illustrate what we mean by equivalent deterministic
12Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013, Section 4.1) show that the
BIC-DIC equivalence breaks down when requiring the same interim expected allocation
probability. They also note that “this notion (of interim expected allocation probabilities)
becomes relevant when, for instance, the designer is not utilitarian or when preferences of
agents outside the mechanism play a role”.
13With slight adjustments, this example applies to the irregular case in Myerson’s setting
where the agents’ ironed virtual values are the same in some interval.
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mechanism. Our main result is far more general and the proof is much more
complex.
Example 2.1. There are two bidders, whose valuations are uniformly dis-
tributed in [0, 1]. Consider the following mechanism. Types are divided into
intervals of equal probability and types in the same interval are treated equally.
If agents’ types belong to the same interval, each agent receives the object
with probability 12 and if agents’ types belong to di erent intervals, the agent
whose type belongs to [12 , 1] gets the object. In each cell, the first number is the
probability that agent 1 gets the object and the second number is the probability
that agent 2 gets the object.













It is immediate that, the following deterministic mechanism is equivalent
in terms of interim expected allocation probabilities. Keeping the transfers
unchanged, it is also easy to see the deterministic mechanism is equivalent in
terms of interim expected utilities and ex ante social welfare.
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[34 , 1] 1, 0 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0
[24 ,
3
4) 0, 1 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0
[14 ,
2
4) 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0 0, 1
[0, 14) 0, 1 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0
In Section 2.4, we show that for whatever randomized mechanism that
the mechanism designer may choose to use, however complicated, there exists
an equivalent mechanism that is deterministic. In other words, going from
mechanisms that are deterministic to randomized mechanisms in general does
not enlarge the set of obtainable outcomes.
2.3.2 Self purification and mutual purification
In this section, we provide two examples to demonstrate the conceptual di er-
ence between the existing approach of “self purification” and our approach of
“mutual purification”.
The first example is motivated by the game of matching pennies, while the
second example is a single unit auction. Both games have two agents, and
share the same information structure as follows.
1. Agent 1’s type is uniformly distributed on (0, 1] with the total probability
1≠ ⁄1(0), and has an atom at the point 0 with ⁄1(0) > 0.
2. Agent 2’s type is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
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3. Agents’ types are independently distributed.
Example 2.2 below illustrates the idea of “self purification”. The behavioral
strategy of agent 2 can be purified since the distribution of agent 2’s type is
atomless, while the behavioral strategy of agent 1 cannot be purified since
agent 1’s type has an atom.
Example 2.2. Consider an m◊m zero-sum generalized “matching pennies”
game with incomplete information, where the positive integer m is su ciently
large such that 1m < ⁄1(0). The information structure is described in the
beginning of this subsection. The action space for both agents is A1 = A2 =
{a1, a2, . . . , am}. The payo  matrix for agent 1 is given below. Notice that the
payo s of both agents do not depend on the type profile.
Agent 1
Agent 2
a1 a2 a3 · · · am
a1 1 ≠1 0 · · · 0
a2 0 1 ≠1 · · · 0
a3 0 0 1 · · · 0... ... ... ... ... ...
am ≠1 0 · · · 0 1




1ÆsÆm ”as, where ”as is the Dirac measure at the point as. It is easy to see
that (f1, f2) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the expected payo s of both
agents are 0.
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Claim 2.1. Agent 2 has a pure strategy f Õ2 such that (f1, f Õ2) is still a behavioral-
strategy equilibrium and provides both agents the same expected payo s, while
agent 1 does not have such a pure strategy.
Proof. It is easy to see that the following pure strategy f Õ2 gives agent 2 the
same expected payo  and (f1, f Õ2) is still a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where
f Õ2(v) =
Y][as, v œ [ s≠1m , sm), 1 Æ s Æ m≠ 1;am, v œ [m≠1m , 1].
We next show that there does not exist a pure strategy g1 of agent 1 such
that g1 is a component of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium with each agent’s
expected payo  being 0. Suppose that (g1, g2) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
such that g1 is a pure strategy of agent 1. Let Ds = {v1 œ V1 : g1(v1) = as}
for 1 Æ s Æ m. Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 œ D1. Let
S = argmax1ÆsÆm ⁄1(Ds). Since ⁄1(Ds) Ø ⁄1(D1) Ø ⁄1(0) > 1m for each s œ S,
S must be a strict subset of {1, . . . ,m}. Without loss of generality, we assume
that sú œ S and sú + 1 /œ S. Given agent 1’s strategy g1, agent 2 can adopt
the pure strategy gÕ2(v2) = asú+1 for any v2 œ V2. Then the expected payo 
of agent 2 is ⁄1(Dsú)≠ ⁄1(Dsú+1) > 0 with the strategy profile (g1, gÕ2). Since
(g1, g2) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the expected payo  of agent 2 must be
at least ⁄1(Dsú)≠ ⁄1(Dsú+1) with the strategy profile (g1, g2), which is strictly
positive. This is a contradiction.
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Example 2.3 below shows how a purification for an agent relies on the
dispersed information of the other agent, which partially illustrates the idea
of “mutual purification”. In particular, for some given randomized mechanism
in the 2-agent setting with independent information as specified above, agent
1 who has an atom in her type space can achieve the same interim expected
payo  by some deterministic mechanism,14 while there does not exist such a
deterministic mechanism for agent 2 who has dispersed information.
Example 2.3. Consider a single unit auction with two agents. The information
structure is described as above. The payo  function of agent i is ‘vi+(1≠ vj)m






The allocation rule q is defined as follows. Let qi(v) be the probability that
agent i gets the object, and q1(v1, v2) = q2(v1, v2) = 12 for any (v1, v2). The
interim expected payo  of agent 1 with value v1 is
⁄
V2
(‘v1 + (1≠ v2)m)q1(v1, v2)⁄2(dv2) = ‘v12 +
1
2(m+ 1) .
The interim expected payo  of agent 2 with value v2 is
⁄
V1
(‘v2 + (1≠ v1)m)q2(v1, v2)⁄1(dv1) = ‘v22 +
⁄1(0)
2 + (1≠ ⁄1(0))
1
2(m+ 1) .
14For simplicity, we only consider such an equivalence in terms of interim expected payo s.
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Claim 2.2. There exists a deterministic mechanism which gives agent 1 the
same interim expected payo ; but there does not exist such a deterministic
mechanism for agent 2.
Proof. We first construct a deterministic mechanism which gives agent 1 the













for any (v1, v2) œ V1 ◊ V2. It is clear that for any v1 œ [0, 1], G(v1, 0) < 0 <
G(v1, 1) = ‘v12 +
1
2(m+1) . One can also check that
ˆG
ˆv2
= ‘v1 + (1 ≠ v2)m > 0
for any v1 œ [0, 1] and v2 œ [0, 1). Hence, for each v1 œ [0, 1], there exists
a unique number g(v1) œ (0, 1) such that G (v1, g(v1)) = 0. By the usual
implicit function theorem, g must be di erentiable, and hence measurable. Let
qˆ1(v1, v2) = 1 if 0 Æ v2 Æ g(v1) and 0 otherwise, and qˆ2(v1, v2) = 1≠ qˆ1(v1, v2).
Then the mechanism qˆ gives agent 1 the same interim expected payo .
We next show that there does not exist any deterministic mechanism that
gives agent 2 the same interim expected payo . Suppose that there exists a
deterministic mechanism q˜ that gives agent 2 the same interim expected payo .
Fix value v2 œ V2 = [0, 1].
Suppose that q˜2(0, v2) = 1. Then the interim expected payo  of agent 2
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with value v2 is⁄
V1
(‘v2 + (1≠ v1)m)q˜2(v1, v2)⁄1(dv1) Ø (‘v2 + 1)⁄1(0).
Recall that ⁄1(0)2 > ‘+
1
m+1 . Hence we have









Thus, the interim expected payo  of agent 2 under the mechanism q˜ is strictly
greater than the interim expected payo  of agent 2 under the mechanism q.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, we must have q˜2(0, v2) = 0 since q˜ is a
deterministic mechanism.
Next, since q˜2(0, v2) = 0, the interim expected payo  of agent 2 is⁄
V1
(‘v2 + (1≠ v1)m)q˜2(v1, v2)⁄1(dv1) =
⁄
(0,1]














2 + (1≠ ⁄1(0))
1
2(m+ 1) .
That is, the interim expected payo  of agent 2 under the mechanism q˜ is
strictly less than the interim expected payo  of agent 2 under the mechanism q.
This is also a contradiction. Therefore, there does not exist any deterministic
mechanism that gives agent 2 the same interim expected payo .
We hasten to emphasize the key di erence between our approach and the
purification method used in the literature. With the classical purification
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method, each agent uses her own dispersed information to purify her behavioral
strategy, which we call “self purification”. In contrast, the purification approach
we adopt to achieve our main result is to purify the randomized mechanism via
other agents’ dispersed information while keeping each agent’s interim expected
allocation probability and interim expected payo  unchanged simultaneously,
which we call “mutual purification”.
2.4 Results
This section establishes the main result of this paper. We consider a general
environment in which agents could have nonlinear and interdependent payo s.
In particular, we assume that all agents have “separable payo s” in the following
sense.
Definition 2.1. For each i œ I, agent i is said to have separable payo  if
for any outcome k œ K and type profile v = (v1, v2, . . . , vI) œ V , her payo 
function can be written as follows:




where M is a positive integer, and wkim (resp. rkim) is ⁄i-integrable (resp.
⁄≠i-integrable) on Vi (resp. on V≠i) for 1 Æ m ÆM .
That is, the payo  of each agent i is a summation of finite terms, where
each term is a product of two components: the first component only depends on
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agent i’s own type, while the second component depends on other agents’ types.
This setup is su ciently general to cover most applications. In particular, it
includes the interdependent payo  function as in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001),
and obviously covers the widely adopted private value payo s as a special case.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that for each agent i œ I, his payo  function is
separable. Then for any mechanism (q, t), there exists a deterministic allocation
rule q˜ such that
1. q and q˜ induce the same interim expected allocation probability;
2. (q˜, t) delivers the same interim expected utility with (q, t) for each agent
i œ I.
Thus, if (q, t) is BIC, then (q˜, t) is also BIC.
Remark 2.3. We prove a stronger result. First, it is clear from the proof of
Theorem 2.1 that the equivalent deterministic mechanism (q˜, t) also guarantees
the same ex post monetary transfers. Therefore, our deterministic mechanism
equivalence result does not require transferable utility. Second, the equivalence
result is immune against coalitions; that is, when there is sharing of information
between the coalition members (except for the grand coalition).15 The second
15Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) also consider the issue of coalitional incentive com-
patibility. They show that the “linking mechanisms” are immune to manipulations by
coalitions.
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point is proved explicitly.
2.5 Discussions
2.5.1 Benefit of randomness revisited
Chawla, Malec, and Sivan (2015) consider multi-agent setting and focus on
the case where the agents’ values are independent both across di erent agents’
types and di erent coordinates of an agent’s type. In particular, Chawla, Malec,
and Sivan (2015, Theorem13) establish a constant factor upper bound for the
benefit of randomness when the agents’ values are independent. In the special
case of multi-unit multi-item auctions, they show that the revenue of any
Bayesian incentive compatible, individually rational randomized mechanism
is at most 33.75 times the revenue of the optimal deterministic mechanism.
In this paper, we push this result to the extreme and show that the revenue
maximizing auction can be deterministically implemented.16
2.5.2 An implementation perspective
We have motivated our result broadly, in terms of revenue, social surplus,
interim expected allocation probabilities, interim expected utilities and even ex
post payments. Alternatively, we may take an implementation perspective to
formulate our result. Beyond the equivalence notion discussed throughout the
16Chawla, Malec, and Sivan (2015, p. 316) remarked that “our bounds on the benefit of
randomness are in some cases quite large and we believe they can be improved”.
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paper, the deterministic allocation rule can also be required to pick some alloca-
tion in the support of the randomized allocation in the stochastic mechanism for
each type profile v. Therefore, when a stochastic mechanism implements some
social goal (i.e., at every type profile v, every realized allocation is consistent
with the social goal), our equivalent deterministic mechanism also has the same
property. We shall explain this point in the following paragraph.
Suppose that q is a random allocation rule. Given the K alternatives, the
set of all nonempty subsets of {1, . . . , K} can have at most 2K ≠ 1 elements
{Cj}1ÆjÆ2K≠1. As a result, the set of type profiles V can be divided into 2K ≠ 1
disjoint subsets {Dj}1ÆjÆ2K≠1 such that
1. the support of q(v) is Cj for all v œ Dj;
2. ⁄(ﬁ1ÆjÆ2K≠1Dj) = 1.
We define 2K ≠ 1 functions {—j}1ÆjÆ2K≠1 such that —j = 1 + 1Dj for each
j; that is, —j is the summation of 1 and the indicator function of the set Dj.
Instead of working with the function h, we can work with the new function
hÕ = (h, —1, . . . , —2K≠1). Lemma A.4 and Proposition A.1 (in the Appendix)















That is, sDj q d⁄ = sDj q˜ d⁄ for each j. Since qkœCj qk(v) = 1 for ⁄-almost all
v œ Dj, sDj qkœCj qk(v)⁄(dv) = ⁄(Dj), which implies that sDj qkœCj q˜k(v)⁄(dv) =
⁄(Dj). As a result, for ⁄-almost all v œ Dj, q˜k = 1 for some k œ Cj. This
proves our claim that the deterministic allocation rule lies in the support of
the random allocation rule.
2.5.3 Assumptions
This subsection discusses the assumptions behind our equivalence result. The
requirement of multiple agents needs no further explanation. Atomless distri-
bution is an indispensable requirement for almost all purification results. See
Example 2.3 where we cannot purify the allocation for agent 2 while keeping her
interim expected utility unchanged because agent 1’s type distribution has an
atom, let alone the stronger requirement that the deterministic mechanism re-
quires such purification for all agents simultaneously. While our result requires
independence, it is worth mentioning that we only require independence across
agents and we do not make any assumption regarding the correlation of the
di erent coordinates of type vi for any agent i œ I. Though separable payo  is
a restriction, this setup is su ciently general to cover most applications; see
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Section 2.4 for details.
2.6 Conclusion
We prove the following mechanism equivalence result: in a general social choice
environment with multiple agents, for any stochastic mechanism, there exists an
equivalent deterministic mechanism. On the one hand, our result implies that
it is without loss of generality to work with stochastic mechanisms, even if the
mechanism designer does not have access to a randomization device, or cannot
fully commit to the outcomes induced by a randomization device. On the other
hand, our result implies that the requirement of deterministic mechanisms is
not restrictive in itself. Even if one is constrained to employ only deterministic
mechanisms, there is no loss of revenue or social welfare. Therefore, our result
provides a foundation for the use of deterministic mechanisms in mechanism






An important strand of mechanism design theory is concerned with the design
of e cient mechanisms. The mechanism designer would like to allocate the
good to the bidder with the highest valuation,1 provide the public good if and
only if the sum of the agents’ valuations is greater than the cost, and facilitate
trading if and only if the buyer’s valuation is higher than the seller’s valuation,
etc.2
The renowned Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism established the
1A leading rationale for the widespread privatization of state-owned assets is to enhance
e ciency; see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000). For example, the U. S. Congress explicitly
mandated the Federal Communications Commission to promote e ciency in its auctions of
frequency bands for telecommunications.
2The problem of implementing socially e cient outcomes has also been extensively
studied in the dynamic setting; see, for example, Bergemann and Välimäki (2010), Athey and
Segal (2013), and Guo and Hörner (2015). Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) provide a general
treatment of the dynamic mechanism design problem in the independent private-value setting
(see also references therein).
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existence of an e cient, incentive-compatible mechanism for a general class of
static mechanism design problems with private values and quasilinear prefer-
ences; see Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) and Vickrey (1961). Subsequently, a
pair of classic papers, Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979)
(AGV), constructed an e cient, incentive-compatible mechanism in which the
transfers were also budget-balanced, using the solution concept of Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium, under the additional assumption that private information is
independent across agents.
In dynamic mechanism design problems with private values, Bergemann and
Välimäki (2010) and Athey and Segal (2013) have successfully addressed this
question, by means of dynamic extensions of the VCG and AGV mechanisms.
However, it is well known that VCG and AGV mechanisms no longer work
in settings with interdependent valuations. Indeed, Maskin (1992), Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have demonstrated, in
increasing generality, that if information signals are statistically independent,
multidimensional (or, if they are single dimensional, but a single crossing
condition is violated), and interdependent, then the implementation of e cient
mechanisms is generically impossible.
In this paper, we study e cient mechanism design in a dynamic environment
with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Our aim is
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to construct an e cient, incentive-compatible dynamic mechanism that is also
budget-balanced in every period of the game. As in the AGV mechanism and
Athey and Segal (2013), we place emphasis on budget balance.
As discussed above, implementation of e cient mechanisms with interde-
pendent valuations runs into di culties even in the static setting. To overcome
such di culties, we extend the following insight from Mezzetti (2004) to the
dynamic setting. In a static mechanism design problem, Mezzetti (2004) con-
structs a novel and elegant “generalized (or two-stage) Groves mechanism” that
bypasses the above di culties, with the assumption that each agent observes
her own realized outcome-decision payo  after the final outcome decision, but
before final transfers, are made.3 While Mezzetti (2004) resolves incentive
compatibility, requiring agents to be able to observe their own payo s before
the mechanism ends is a strong assumption in the static setting from an applied
perspective. In the dynamic setting, it may seem natural to assume that in
each period, each agent could observe her own realized outcome-decision payo 
from the previous period.
This assumption is related to the literature on contingent payments; see
Hansen (1985), Crémer (1987), Samuelson (1987) and more recently, DeMarzo,
3Two-stage mechanisms can also be used to achieve goals other than e ciency (e.g.,
surplus extraction); see Mezzetti (2007).
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Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) and Che and Kim (2010) among others.4 In
this paper, we do not require that the realized outcome-decision payo s are
observable to the mechanism designer, but we rely instead on the agents’ reports
of their own realized payo s.
This paper places emphasis on budget balance in every period of the game.
Indeed, the construction of an e cient, incentive-compatible mechanism is
straightforward. In each period, the mechanism designer makes a transfer to
each agent that is an adjusted amount of the sum of the other agents’ outcome-
decision payo s from the previous period. This su ces to make each agent the
residual claimant of the social surplus and provide the agents with the incentive
to be truthful as long as the mechanism prescribes an e cient decision rule.
Under the assumption of independent types, we show that dynamic e ciency
can be achieved with balanced budget. As in the AGV mechanism and Athey
and Segal (2013), our construction of the budget-balanced mechanism requires
all the other agents to pitch in to pay each agent’s incentive term. This ensures
that the budget is balanced in every period of the game. The key di erence
between our mechanism and the “balanced team mechanism” in Athey and
Segal (2013) is as follows. In their paper, only the transfers of the most recent
two periods are relevant for each agent’s incentive in the current period, since
4Lehrer (1992) and Tomala (1999) have also adopted similar assumptions of observable
payo  in the environment of repeated games.
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the expectation of the transfers afterwards is zero.5 However, in our mechanism,
all the future transfers could influence the incentive of the current period.
Another approach that studies e cient mechanism design exploits the
correlation of private information; see the seminal contribution of Crémer and
McLean (1988) in the static setting. More recently, Liu (2014) and Noda (2015)
extend the insight of Crémer and McLean (1988) to the dynamic setting and
construct e cient and incentive-compatible mechanisms respectively. These
results leverage on the inter-temporal correlation of private information and do
not apply in our setting. Hörner, Takahashi, and Vieille (2015) apply a similar
technique to dynamic Bayesian games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
model. Section 3.3 constructs the e cient, incentive-compatible and budget-
balanced mechanism and Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Setup
Notation. We consider a dynamic mechanism design environment with in-
terdependent valuations in a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model. There is
a finite set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of risk neutral agents. Time is discrete, indexed
by t œ N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. The state of the world ◊it for agent i is a general
5See the proof of Proposition 2 in Athey and Segal (2013).
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Markov process on the state space  i. The aggregate state is given by the
vector ◊t = (◊1t , ◊2t , . . . , ◊It ) with   =
r
iœI  i. Write ◊≠it œ  ≠i = rj ”=i j for
the state of all agents except agent i. The outcome space is a measurable set
X endowed with the ‡-algebra X . The initial state ◊0 œ   is assumed to be
publicly known. The current state ◊t œ   and current decision xt œ X define
a probability distribution for state variable ◊t+1 on   by the law of motion
Q(·|xt, ◊t).
Timing. We consider mechanisms in which, following a publicly observed
initial state ◊0 œ  , a decision x0 œ X is made. Then in each period t Ø 1, each
agent privately observes her type ◊it œ  i. Agents make reports simultaneously
and a public decision xt œ X is made at the end of each period. Each agent i
also receives a transfer yit œ R. We assume that the past reports of each agent
and the public decision are observable to all agents. All agents discount the
future with a common discount factor ” œ (0, 1).
Interdependent valuations. We allow agents to have interdependent
valuations in the sense that agent i’s payo  could depend on the signals of all
the other agents for each i œ I. If a sequence of types {◊t}tØ0 is realized, a
sequence of public decisions {xt}tØ0 and transfers {yt}tØ0 are determined, then
the discounted payo  of agent i is
ÿ
tØ0
”t[ui(xt, ◊t) + yit],
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where ui : X ◊   æ R is assumed to be measurable and bounded. We will
refer to ui as the outcome-decision payo  of agent i.
Independent types. Throughout this paper, we shall assume independent
types. That is, conditional on decisions, the private information of agent i does
not have any direct e ect on the distribution of the current and future types
of other agents (we still allow one agent’s reports to a ect the future types of
other agents through the implemented decisions). More formally,
Definition 3.1. Agents have independent types if given any xt œ X and
◊t = (◊1t , ◊2t , . . . , ◊It ) œ  , the transition probability Q(·|xt, ◊t) = ¢iœIQi(·|xt, ◊it),
where Qi(·|xt, ◊it) is a transition probability from X ◊ i to —( i).
Equilibrium notion. The truthtelling strategy of agent i always reports
her state ◊it in every period t Ø 1 truthfully, regardless of the observed past (in
particular, regardless of whether she has lied in the past). We will consider
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in truthtelling strategies, with beliefs that
assign probability 1 to the other agents’ latest reports being truthful.
3.2.2 E ciency
A social policy is a measurable function ‰ :  æ X, where ‰(◊) represents the
decision made when the realized state in this period is ◊. Starting from an initial
type ◊0 œ  , a social policy ‰ together with the transition probabilityQ uniquely
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determine a probability measure over the sequence of states (◊t)tØ0 œ  N.












We characterize the e cient social policy ‰ú :  æ X and the associated
social value function V :  æ R by the following recursion using the principle
of dynamic programming:














where v(◊) = qiœI ui(‰ú(◊), ◊).6
3.3 Mechanism
In this section, we construct an e cient and budget-balanced dynamic mech-
anism such that truthtelling strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
As discussed in the introduction, we assume that in each period, each agent
observes her own realized outcome-decision payo  from the previous period.
Assumption 3.1. In each period t+1 (t Ø 1) and for any xt œ X, each agent
i observes her own realized outcome-decision payo  from period t.
6Throughout this paper, we assume that the e cient social policy exists.
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For simplicity of exposition, in what follows, we go a step further and
assume that in each period, the realized outcome-decision payo s from the
previous period are observable to the mechanism designer. The mechanism we
construct still works under the original assumption. Indeed, in each period
t+ 1, the mechanism designer could require the agents to report their realized
outcome-decision payo s from period t. Since for each agent i, the report of
her own outcome-decision payo  does not a ect her utility, we can assume that
agent i truthfully reports her outcome-decision payo  from the previous period;
see Mezzetti (2004) for further discussions.





V (rit, ◊˜≠it )Q≠i(d◊˜≠it |‰ú(rt≠1), r≠it≠1)≠
⁄
 
V (◊˜t)Q(d◊˜t|‰ú(rt≠1), rt≠1) and






for each i œ I.
From the mechanism designer’s perspective,  i(rt≠1, rit) characterizes the
change in the expected social value if agent i reports rit in period t, given the
report rt≠1 in period t≠ 1.
Construct the following mechanism (‰ú, y):
1. The socially e cient policy ‰ú is implemented in every period; that is, in
7Since the initial state ◊0 œ   is publicly known, we assume r0 © ◊0.
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period t, the allocation is ‰ú(rt) based on the reports rt.






wjt ≠ I ≠ 1I” [v(rt)≠ i(rt≠1, rt)] ,
where wit is the realized outcome-decision payo  of agent i œ I in period
t.8
As in the AGV mechanism and Athey and Segal (2013), our mechanism
requires all the other agents to pitch in to pay each agent’s incentive term,
which ensures that the budget is balanced on the equilibrium path.
Theorem 3.1. Truthtelling strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
the mechanism (‰ú, y). Furthermore, on the equilibrium path, the mechanism
(‰ú, y) is budget-balanced in every period of the game.
Proof. The logic of the proof is summarized as follows. Step 1 begins by
considering a simpler mechanism (‰ú, z) where the transfer zit to agent i is
an adjusted amount of the sum of the realized outcome-decision payo s of all
the other agents in period t≠ 1. We show that truthtelling strategies form a
PBE in this mechanism. The idea, as in the standard VCG mechanism, is to
make each agent the residual claimant of the full surplus. Step 2 proves that
8We let yi0 = yi1 © 0 for each agent i œ I.
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the expected present value of agent i’s gain from deviating in the mechanism
(‰ú, y) is the same as in the simple mechanism (‰ú, z). Therefore, truthtelling
strategies still form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the mechanism (‰ú, y).
Lastly, Step 3 verifies that on the equilibrium path, the mechanism (‰ú, y) is
budget-balanced in every period of the game.
Step 1. We consider a simpler mechanism (‰ú, z) where the allocation
rule is still the e cient social policy ‰ú, but the transfer agent i receives in




t≠1, where (w1t≠1, w2t≠1, . . . , wIt≠1) are the realized
outcome-decision payo s in period t≠ 1.9 By the one-stage deviation principle,
to verify PBE it su ces to show that a one-stage deviation of any agent i œ I to
reporting any rit œ  i instead of her true type ◊it œ  i in period t is unprofitable.
If all agents choose the truthtelling strategy, then the expected discounted
payo  of agent i in period t is
ui(‰ú(◊t), ◊t) + zit + E
SUÿ
kØ1
”k(ui(‰ú(◊t+k), ◊t+k) + zit+k)|‰ú(◊t), ◊t
TV





















= V (◊t) + zit.
9We let zi0 = zi1 © 0 for each agent i œ I.
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Suppose that agent i reports rit instead. Let x = ‰ú(rit, ◊≠it ). Then her
expected discounted payo  in period t is
ui(x, ◊t) + zit + E
SUÿ
kØ1
”k(ui(‰ú(◊t+k), ◊t+k) + zit+k)|x, ◊t
TV
















































Thus, a one-stage deviation of any agent i œ I to reporting any rit œ  i instead
of her true type ◊it œ  i in period t is unprofitable. Truthtelling strategies form
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Step 2. We prove that the expected present value of agent i’s gain from
deviating in the mechanism (‰ú, y) is the same as in the simple mechanism
(‰ú, z).
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In period t≠ 1, consider the case where the true type profile is ◊t≠1 and the
reported type profile is (r≠jt≠1, ◊jt≠1) for some j œ I. That is, agent j truthfully














V (◊˜t)Q(d◊˜t|‰ú(r≠jt≠1, ◊jt≠1), r≠jt≠1, ◊jt≠1)
= 0,
where the first equality follows from the definition of  i.
Thus, for each agent i œ I, if all the other agents truthfully report their
types, then the expectation of the term qj ”=i j(rt≠1, rjt ) in  i(rt≠1, rt) is 0
(from agent i’s perspective) regardless of her own report. In other words, if
agent i assigns probability 1 to the event that all the other agents truthfully
report their types, then the term qj ”=i j(rt≠1, rjt ) in the transfer yit+1 cannot
distort her incentive.
Next we consider other terms v(rt)≠  i(rt≠1, rit) in the transfer yit+1 that
could potentially distort agent i’s incentives. Suppose that all the other agents
adopt the truthtelling strategy; that is, r≠it≠1 = ◊≠it≠1 in period t ≠ 1. As for
agent i, her past types are payo -irrelevant since (1) the past types do not
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enter into her future outcome-decision payo  functions and transfers; and (2)
her belief about the opponents’ current types depends on her report, but not
the true type, in the previous period. As a result, we can assume that agent i
truthfully reports in period t≠ 1. We focus on the case that the true type of
agent i is ◊it but she reports rit in period t.
In what follows, we consider the summation of the expectation of v(rt+k)≠
 i(rt+k≠1, rit+k) for k Ø 0 (from agent i’s perspective). If agent i deviates from
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◊it to rit, we have⁄
 ≠i


















































v(◊˜t+k)|‰ú(rit, ◊˜≠it ), ◊it, ◊˜≠it
2








V (◊˜t+k)|‰ú(rit, ◊˜≠it ), ◊it, ◊˜≠it )
2






V (◊˜t+1)|‰ú(rit, ◊˜≠it ), rit, ◊˜≠it )
2









V (◊˜t+k)|‰ú(rit, ◊˜≠it ), ◊it, ◊˜≠it )
2




SUv(rit, ◊˜≠it )≠ V (rit, ◊˜≠it )
+ ”E
1
V (◊˜t+1)|‰ú(rit, ◊˜≠it ), rit, ◊˜≠it )


















V (◊˜t)Q(d◊˜t|‰ú(◊t≠1), ◊t≠1). (3.9)
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The first equality follows from the definition of  i. Terms (3.1), (3.2), (3.5)
aggregate to term (3.7) and terms (3.3), (3.4), (3.6) aggregate to term (3.8)
respectively. It is easy to see that both terms (3.7) and (3.8) are equal to zero.
Finally, (3.9) does not depend on agent i’s report.
Therefore, the transfer scheme y together with ‰ú provides each agent the
same expected gain from deviating as the simple mechanism (‰ú, z). Since
truthtelling strategies form a PBE in the latter mechanism, truthtelling strate-
gies also form a PBE if the mechanism (‰ú, y) is adopted.
Step 3. We show that in the mechanism (‰ú, y), the transfers yit+1 balance
the budget on the equilibrium path; that is, qiœI yit+1 = 0. On the equilibrium


































































 j(◊t≠1, ◊jt ) = 0.
3.4 Conclusion
In a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private
information, we construct an e cient, incentive-compatible dynamic mechanism
that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. To overcome the
di culties with interdependent valuations, we assume that in each period, each
agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payo s from the previous
period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting.
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We conclude with several observations. Firstly, our result can be generalized
to the case where each agent only observes her own realized outcome-decision
payo  after any finite number of periods. Secondly, we see no di culties in
extending our result to the case of time-dependent payo s. This allows us to
cover finite-horizon environments and in particular, Mezzetti (2004). Finally,
in dynamic mechanism design problems with private values, the assumption
that each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payo  is trivially
satisfied. Therefore, our result can also be viewed as a construction of an
e cient, incentive-compatible and budget-balanced mechanism in this setting.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter Two
A.1 Technical lemmas
In the following, we present several lemmas as the technical preparation for
the proof of Proposition 1.1
If (X,X ) and (Y,Y) are measurable spaces, then a measurable rectangle is
a subset A◊B of X◊Y , where A œ X and B œ Y are measurable subsets of X
and Y , respectively. The “sides” A, B of the measurable rectangle A◊B can
be arbitrary measurable sets; they are not required to be intervals. A discrete
rectangle is a measurable rectangle such that each of its sides is a finite set.
1These lemmas extend the corresponding mathematical results in Arkin and Levin
(1972) from the special case with I = 2 and ⁄ the uniform distribution on [0, 1] ◊ [0, 1]
to the general setting in this paper. The corresponding mathematical results in Arkin
and Levin (1972) were used to show the following result (see Theorem 2.3 therein):
“Suppose that f1 œ L÷1(X ◊ Y,Rl1), f2 œ L÷1(X ◊ Y,Rl2) and f3 œ L÷1(X ◊ Y,Rl3),
where X = Y = [0, 1] and ÷ is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] ◊ [0, 1]. Let A be
the simplex {a = (a1, . . . , aK) :
q
1ÆkÆK ak = 1, ak Ø 0}. Given any measurable func-
tion – from X ◊ Y to A, there exists another measurable function – from X ◊ Y to
the vertices of the simplex A such that
s
[0,1] f1(x, y)–(x, y) dy =
s
[0,1] f1(x, y)–(x, y) dy,s
[0,1] f2(x, y)–(x, y) dx =
s




[0,1] f3(x, y)–(x, y) dxdy =s
[0,1]
s
[0,1] f3(x, y)–(x, y) dxdy.”
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Lemma A.1. Let D be a Borel measurable subset of V , and F ™ V a
measurable rectangle with sides Yi ™ Vi of measure li, i œ I. Assume that
⁄(D ﬂ F ) Ø (1≠ ‘)⁄(F ) for some 0 < ‘ < 1. Then for any i,






 i = {vi œ Vi : ⁄≠i(Dvi ﬂ Fvi) > (1≠
Ô
‘)⁄≠i(Fvi)}.
Let  Ci be the complement of  i in Vi. Then
(1≠ ‘) 1ÆjÆI lj = (1≠ ‘)⁄(F )





































‘⁄i( i) ·  j ”=ilj + (1≠
Ô
‘) 1ÆjÆI lj.
The first inequality holds due to the condition that ⁄(D ﬂ F ) Ø (1≠ ‘)⁄(F ).
The second inequality is true since ⁄≠i(DviﬂFvi) Æ (1≠
Ô
‘)⁄≠i(Fvi) for vi œ  Ci .





This completes the proof.
Lemma A.2. Let D be a Borel measurable subset of V with ⁄(D) > 0, i˜1, . . . , i˜I
be positive natural numbers, and 0 < ‘ < 1 be su ciently small such that
‘Õ =  1ÆjÆI i˜j · ‘ < 1 and  1ÆjÆI i˜j · ‘Õ
1
2I < 1.
Consider the system of measurable rectangles F i1,...,iI = r1ÆjÆI Y ijj , where
1 Æ ij Æ i˜j and Y 1j , . . . , Y i˜jj are pairwise disjoint subsets on Vj for 1 Æ j Æ I
such that ⁄(F i1,...,iI ﬂ D) Ø (1 ≠ ‘)⁄(F i1,...,iI ). Then there exists a discrete
rectangle {vi11 , . . . , viII }{1ÆijÆi˜j ,1ÆjÆI} such that
1. (vi11 , . . . , viII ) œ F i1,...,iI ﬂD for 1 Æ ij Æ i˜j and 1 Æ j Æ I;
2. for each 1 Æ j Æ I, {vijj } are di erent points for 1 Æ ij Æ i˜j.
Proof. First, we consider the set
 i1,...,iI1 = {v1 œ Y i11 : ⁄≠1(Dv1 ﬂ F i1,...,iIv1 ) > (1≠
Ô
‘Õ)⁄≠1(F i1,...,iIv1 )}.
Denote  i11 = ﬂ1ÆikÆi˜k,2ÆkÆI i1,...,iI1 . We have
⁄1( i11 ) = ⁄1(Y i11 )≠ ⁄1
1
ﬁ1ÆikÆi˜k,2ÆkÆI(Y i11 \  i1,...,iI1 )
2




⁄1(Y i11 )≠ ⁄1( i1,...,iI1 )
2

















The second inequality holds due to Lemma A.1. We fix points yi11 œ  i11
arbitrarily, as long as they are all distinct.
Second, let






) > (1≠‘Õ 14 )( p
3ÆkÆI
⁄k)(F i1,...,iI(yi11 ,v2))}.









) > (1≠Ô‘Õ)( p
2ÆkÆI
⁄k)(F i1,...,iIyi11 ).
By Lemma A.1, we have
⁄2( i1,...,iI2 ) Ø (1≠ ‘Õ
1
4 )⁄2(Y i22 ).
Denote  i22 = ﬂ1ÆijÆi˜j ,j ”=2 i1,...,iI2 . We have
⁄2( i22 ) = ⁄2(Y i22 )≠ ⁄2
1
ﬁ1ÆikÆi˜k,k ”=2(Y i22 \  i1,...,iI2 )
2




⁄2(Y i22 )≠ ⁄2( i1,...,iI2 )
2




⁄2(Y i22 )≠ (1≠ ‘Õ
1








We fix points yi22 œ  i22 arbitrarily, as long as they are all distinct, and are also
di erent from {yi11 }.
Repeating this procedure until I ≠ 1, we can find yikk œ  ikk for 1 Æ ik Æ i˜k











> (1≠ ‘Õ 12I≠1 )⁄I(F i1,...,iI(yi11 ,...,yiI≠2I≠2 ,vI≠1))
Ô
.













= Y iII for any i1, . . . , iI . Then
⁄I(EiI ) = ⁄I
3




= ⁄I(Y iII )≠ ⁄I
3
ﬁ1ÆikÆi˜k,1ÆkÆI≠1(Y iII \D(yi11 ,...,yiI≠1I≠1 ))
4























⁄I(Y iII )≠ (1≠ ‘Õ
1
2I≠1 )⁄I(F i1,··· ,iI(yi11 ,...,yiI≠1I≠1 )
)
B




⁄I(Y iII )≠ (1≠ ‘Õ
1










The second inequality holds since yiI≠1I≠1 œ  iI≠1I≠1 ™  i1,...,iII≠1 , and hence





) > (1≠ ‘Õ 12I≠1 )⁄I(F i1,...,iI(yi11 ,...,yiI≠1I≠1 )).
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Fix points yiII œ EiI arbitrarily, as long as they are all di erent, and are di erent
from {yijj }1ÆjÆI≠1,1ÆijÆi˜j . By the choice of EiI , (yi11 , . . . , yiII ) œ F i1,...,iI ﬂD for
any 1 Æ ij Æ i˜j and 1 Æ j Æ I. This completes the proof.
Now we prove the last lemma.
Lemma A.3. E is not dense in L⁄1(D,R).2 In particular, there is a measurable
function d(v) with a finite set of values, which cannot be approximated in
measure on (D,B(D),⁄) by functions in E .




B(v,”) g d⁄. By Lemma 4.1.2 in Ledrappier and Young (1985), g” æ g
for ⁄-almost all v œ RlI as ” æ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume
that this convergence result holds for each point of D and the function h is
continuous on D.
Fix natural numbers i˜j satisfying the condition that l ·qJœJ ( jœJ i˜j) <
 1ÆjÆI i˜j. For any discrete rectangle L = {(vi11 , . . . , viII ) œ D : 1 Æ ij Æ i˜j, 1 Æ






h(vi11 , . . . , viII ) · wi1,...,iI}1ÆijÆi˜j ,jœJ,JœJ ,
where l0 = IKM + 1, w is a vector with dimensions i˜1, . . . , i˜I and wi1,...,iI is
the corresponding component.
2Recall that E is defined in the proof of Proposition 1.
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Fix a discrete rectangle L ™ D such that
• L = {(vi11 , . . . , viII ) œ D : 1 Æ ij Æ i˜j, 1 Æ j Æ I};
• the rank of the mapping TL is maximal, say r.
Consider the system of qJœJ ( jœJ i˜j) homogeneous linear equations with
 1ÆjÆI i˜j unknowns:
TL(w) = 0.
We take r equations and r unknowns for which the corresponding deter-
minant is nonzero. Without loss of generality, we focus on this r ◊ r matrix
and denote it as Ls, then det(Ls) ”= 0. For any discrete rectangle L, denote
Ls as the restriction of the vector generated by the operator TL onto the same
matrix. Since h is continuous, det(Ls) ”= 0 for any discrete rectangle L in a
small open neighborhood of L.
Let wL be a nontrivial solution of the system corresponding to the discrete
rectangle L in the sense that TL(wL) = 0. For any discrete rectangle L ™ D
such that det(Ls) ”= 0, we provide a solution wL below such that TL(wL) = 0.
• Since det(Ls) ”= 0, the rank of the system corresponding to the operator TL
is at least r. Due to the choice of L, the rank of the system corresponding
to the operator TL is at most r, and hence is r. As a result, the equations
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that do not occur in the determinant det(Ls) are linear combinations of
the r equations that do.
• We focus on the r equations that occur in the determinant det(Ls), and
let wi1,...,iIL = wi1,...,iIL if the column corresponding to the unknown w
i1,...,iI
L
does not occur in the determinant det(Ls).
• The remaining r unknowns of wi1,...,iIL , corresponding to the columns that
occur in the determinant det(Ls), can be obtained by Cramer’s rule.
By the above construction, it is obvious that wL depends continuously on
the r nodes of the discrete rectangle L corresponding to the columns of det(Ls).
Pick numbers di1,...,iI subject to q1ÆijÆi˜j ,1ÆjÆI di1,...,iI ·wi1,...,iIL = 1. Consider
the measurable rectangles
Gi1,...,iI = {v = (v1, . . . , vI) œ RlI : |vj ≠ vijj | Æ ”, 1 Æ j Æ I},
and
F i1,...,iI = {v = (v1, . . . , vI) œ V : |vj ≠ vijj | Æ ”, 1 Æ j Æ I}.
Then for su ciently small ”, {Gi1,...,iI} are pairwise disjoint, and {F i1,...,iI} are
also pairwise disjoint.
By the first paragraph of this proof, 1⁄(B(v,”))
s
B(v,”) 1D d⁄ æ 1D(v) for
each v œ D. Since (vi11 , . . . , viII ) œ D, ⁄(Gi1,...,iI ﬂ D) Ø (1 ≠ ‘)⁄(Gi1,...,iI ) for
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su ciently small ”, where ‘ is given in the proof of Lemma A.2. Since D is a
subset of V , we have
⁄(F i1,...,iI ﬂD) = ⁄(Gi1,...,iI ﬂD) Ø (1≠ ‘)⁄(Gi1,...,iI ) Ø (1≠ ‘)⁄(F i1,...,iI ).
In addition, since q1ÆijÆi˜j ,1ÆjÆI di1,...,iI · wi1,...,iIL is continuous in the discrete
rectangle, for su ciently small ”, q1ÆijÆi˜j ,1ÆjÆI di1,...,iI · wi1,...,iIL Ø 12 for
L = {(vi11 , . . . , viII ) œ F i1,...,iI ﬂD : 1 Æ ij Æ i˜j, 1 Æ j Æ I}.
To summarize, we pick ” > 0 su ciently small such that
1. ⁄(F i1,...,iI ﬂD) Ø (1≠ ‘)⁄(F i1,...,iI ); and
2. q1ÆijÆi˜j ,1ÆjÆI di1,...,iI · wi1,...,iIL Ø 12 for any discrete rectangle
L = {(vi11 , . . . , viII ) œ F i1,...,iI ﬂD : 1 Æ ij Æ i˜j, 1 Æ j Æ I}.
Let
d(v) =
Y][di1,...,iI , if v œ F i1,...,iI ﬂD;0, otherwise.
If it could be approximated by functions in E on (D,B(D),⁄) in measure, then
there is a sequence dn(v) = h(v) ·qJœJ ÂnJ (vJ) which converges to d on some
Borel measurable subset C such that ⁄(C) = ⁄(D).
By condition (1) above and Lemma A.2, there exists a discrete rectangle
L = {(vi11 , . . . , viII )}{1ÆijÆi˜j ,1ÆjÆI} such that (vi11 , . . . , viII ) œ F i1,...,iI ﬂ C for
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1 Æ ij Æ i˜j and 1 Æ j Æ I. Since q1ÆijÆi˜j ,j /œJ wi1,...,iIL h(vi11 , . . . , viII ) = 0 for any

































wi1,...,iIL h(vi11 , . . . , viII )
2











wi1,...,iIL h(vi11 , . . . , viII )
Z_^
_\ · ÂnJ (viJJ )
= 0,
where viJJ denotes the vector (v
ij





2 by condition (2) above, which is a contradiction. As a result, the function d
cannot be approximated by functions in E on (D,B(D),⁄) in measure. This
completes the proof.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Let h be a function from V to RIKM+1++ such that h0(v) © 1, and hikm(v) =
rkim(v≠i)3 for each i œ I, 1 Æ k Æ K and 1 Æ m ÆM .4 Let J be the set of all
nonempty proper subsets of I, and   be the set of all allocation rules. That is,
given any q˜ œ  , q˜ is a measurable function and qkœK q˜k(v) = 1 for ⁄-almost
all v œ V . For any coalition J ™ I, denote ⁄J =ojœJ ⁄j.
Fix a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism (q, t). We consider the
allocation rule q˜ œ   such that for any J œ J and ⁄J -almost all vJ œ VJ ,
E (q˜hj|vJ) = E (qhj|vJ) (A.1)
for j = 0 or j = ikm, i œ I, 1 Æ k Æ K and 1 Æ m ÆM .
Definition A.1. We define the following set  q:
 q = {q˜ œ   : q˜ satisfies Equation (A.1)}.
In what follows, we first provide the following characterization result for the
set  q:  q is a nonempty, convex and weakly compact set in some Banach space.
3Throughout this paper, IKM is the product of the integers I, K and M . However, the
subscript ikm is not the product of the numbers i, k and m, but refers to the vector (i, k,m)
identifying the function rkim.
4Denote R++ as the strictly positive real line. We assume that h is strictly positive
without loss of generality. Indeed, we can work with the function hÕ from V to R2IKM+1+
such that hÕ0(v) © 1, hÕ1ikm(v) = |rkim(v≠i)|+ 1, and hÕ2ikm(v) = rkim(v≠i) + |rkim(v≠i)|+ 1 for
each i œ I, 1 Æ k Æ K and 1 Æ m ÆM . The function hÕ is strictly positive and su ces for
our purpose.
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Therefore, the classical Krein-Milman Theorem (see Royden and Fitzpatrick
(2010, p. 296)) implies that  q admits extreme points. We proceed by showing
that all extreme points of the set  q are deterministic mechanisms.5 The
existence of a deterministic mechanism that is equivalent in terms of interim
expected allocation probabilities immediately follows. The equivalence in
terms of interim expected utilities and ex ante expected social surplus follows
from Equation (A.4) and the separable payo  assumption. The incentive
compatibility of the deterministic mechanism follows from Equation (A.4) and
the assumption that types are independent.
The following lemma characterizes the set  q.
Lemma A.4.  q is a nonempty, convex and weakly compact subset.
Proof of Lemma A.4. Clearly, the set  q is nonempty and convex. We first
show that  q is norm closed in L⁄1(V,RK), where L⁄1(V,RK) is the L1 space of
all measurable mappings from V to RK under the probability measure ⁄.
Suppose that the sequence {qm} ™  q and qm æ q0 in L⁄1(V,RK). Then by
the Riesz-Fischer Theorem (see Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, p. 398)), there
5Manelli and Vincent (2007) use a related technique in the screening literature. Manelli
and Vincent (2007) consider revenue maximizing multi-product monopolist and study the
extreme points of the set of feasible mechanisms. They show that, with multiple goods,
extreme points could be stochastic mechanisms. In contrast, we work with the mechanism
design setting, study a particular set of interest  q and show that all extreme points are
deterministic. Apart from this general approach, the technical parts of the proofs are
dramatically di erent.
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exists a subsequence {qms} of {qm}, which converges to q0 ⁄-almost everywhere.
Since qkœK qkms(v) = 1 for ⁄-almost all v, qkœK qk0(v) = 1 for ⁄-almost all v.
As a result, q0 œ  .















for j = 0 or j = ikm. The first equality is due to the dominated convergence
theorem, and the second equality holds since {qms} ™  q. Thus, q0 œ  q,
which implies that  q is norm closed in L⁄1(V,RK).
Since  q is convex,  q is also weakly closed in L⁄1(V,RK) by Mazur’s
Theorem (see Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, p. 292)). As   is weakly compact
in L⁄1(V,RK), we have that  q is weakly compact in L⁄1(V,RK), and hence has
extreme points.
Since  q is a nonempty, convex and weakly compact set,  q has extreme
points. The following result shows that all extreme points of q are deterministic
allocations.
Proposition A.1. All extreme points of  q are deterministic allocations.
Proof of Proposition A.1. Pick an allocation rule q˜ œ  q which is not
deterministic, we shall show that q˜ is not an extreme point of  q.
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Since q˜ is not deterministic, there is a positive number 0 < ” < 1, a
Borel measurable set D ™ V such that ⁄(D) > 0, and indices j1, j2 such that
” Æ q˜j1(v), q˜j2(v) Æ 1≠” for any v œ D. For any J œ J , letDJ be the projection
of D on rjœJ Vj. For any vJ œ DJ , let D≠J(vJ) = {v≠J : (vJ , v≠J) œ D}
(abbreviated as DvJ ).
Consider the following problem on – œ L⁄Œ(D,R): for any J œ J and
vJ œ DJ , ⁄
D≠J (vJ )
–(vJ , v≠J)h(vJ , v≠J)⁄≠J(dv≠J) = 0. (A.2)
Recall that h is a function taking values in RIKM+1. For simplicity, denote
l0 = IKM + 1. Define the set E as
E = {h(v) · ÿ
JœJ
ÂJ(vJ) : ÂJ œ L⁄Œ(DJ ,Rl0),’J œ J }.
Then a bounded measurable function – in L⁄Œ(D,R) is a solution to Prob-
lem (A.2) if and only if sD –Ïd⁄ = 0 for any Ï œ E . Lemma A.3 shows that E
is not dense in L⁄1(D,R). By Corollary 5.108 in Aliprantis and Border (2006),
Problem (A.2) has a nontrivial bounded solution –.
Without loss of generality, we assume that |–| Æ ”. We extend the domain
of – to V by letting –(v) = 0 when v /œ D. For every v œ V , define
qˆ(v) = q˜(v) + –(v) (ej1 ≠ ej2) ;
q(v) = q˜(v) + –(v) (ej2 ≠ ej1) .
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Then qkœK qˆk(v) = qkœK qk(v) = qkœK q˜k(v) = 1. If v œ D, then 0 Æ
qˆj1(v), qj2(v) Æ 1 as ” Æ q˜j1(v), q˜j2(v) Æ 1 ≠ ”, and qˆj(v) = qj(v) = q˜j(v) for
j ”= j1, j2. If v /œ D, then qˆ(v) = q(v) = q˜(v) as –(v) = 0. Thus, qˆ, q œ  .





mapping p œ L⁄Œ(V,RK),
⁄
V
(qˆ · p)h⁄(dv) =
⁄
V
(q˜ · p)h⁄(dv) +
⁄
V



















we have that ⁄
V




which implies that qˆ œ  q. Similarly, one can show that q œ  q. Since qˆ and q
are distinct and q˜ = 12(qˆ + q), q˜ is not an extreme point of  q.
Now we are ready to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Fix a mechanism (q, t). The proof is then divided
into two steps. In the first step, we obtain a deterministic allocation rule q˜
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which has the same interim expected allocation probability with q. In the
second step, we verify that (q˜, t) and (q, t) deliver the same interim expected
utility for each agent.
By Proposition A.1, every extreme point of  q is a deterministic allocation
rule. Therefore, we can fix a measurable allocation rule q˜ such that
1. q˜k (v) = 0 or 1 for ⁄-almost all v œ V and 1 Æ k Æ K;















for any j œ I, 1 Æ k Æ K and 1 Æ m ÆM .
Let Di be the subset of Vi such that Equation (A.3) or (A.4) does not hold.
Then ⁄i(Di) = 0. Define a new allocation rule qˆ such that
qˆ(v) =
Y][q(v), if vi œ Di for some i œ I;q˜(v), otherwise.
Then qˆk (v) = 0 or 1 for ⁄-almost all v œ V and 1 Æ k Æ K.
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Fix agent i and vi œ Vi. If vi œ Di, then qˆ(vi, v≠i) = q(vi, v≠i) ands
V≠i qˆ(vi, v≠i)⁄≠i(dv≠i) =
s

























where D≠i = ﬁjœI,j ”=i
1
Dj ◊rsœI,s ”=i,j Vs2. The first equality holds by dividing
V≠i as D≠i and V≠i \ D≠i. The second equality is due to the definition of qˆ.
The third equality holds since ⁄≠i(D≠i) = 0. The last equality is due to the
condition that vi /œ Di. As a result, Equation (A.3) holds for qˆ and every
vi œ Vi. Similarly, one can check that Equation (A.4) also holds for qˆ and every
vi œ Vi.
Suppose that the mechanism (qˆ, t) is adopted. By Equation (A.3), the
allocation rules q and qˆ induce the same interim expected allocation. We need
to check that they induce the same interim expected utility. If agent i observes
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uki (vi, v≠i)qk(vÕi, v≠i)≠ ti(vÕi, v≠i)
TV⁄≠i(dv≠i).
The first and second equalities follow from the separable payo  assumption.
The fourth equality follows from Equation (A.4) and also the assumption that
types are independent. All other equalities are simple algebras. Thus, these
two mechanisms (q, t) and (qˆ, t) deliver the same interim expected utility for
every agent. If (q, t) is Bayesian incentive compatible, then (qˆ, t) is clearly
Bayesian incentive compatible. This completes the proof.
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